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I. INTRODUCTION
Registering hedge fund advisers is controversial because hedge funds
evolved as unsupervised entities, free of most regulatory supervision.
Hedge funds’ ability to invest in global markets without supervision and
significant disclosure obligations was important for successful hedge
fund launches, helped generate higher returns, and attracted investors.
Regulatory oversight could be an infringement on hedge fund managers’
ability to generate absolute returns.1 The hedge fund industry has
traditionally opposed the registration of hedge fund managers and increased
disclosure.2

1. See Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J.
1, 31 (2006) (arguing that direct regulation of hedge funds may also make the financial
system less resilient by reducing the willingness of hedge funds to act as liquidity
providers in times of crisis and that increased regulation may lead individual hedge funds
to take on more risk or to invest less effort in managing risk); EISNERAMPER & HOFSTRA
UNIV. FRANK G. ZARB SCH. OF BUS., DODD-FRANK BILL—A YEAR AND A HALF LATER:
VIEWS FROM THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.eisneramper.
com/uploadedFiles/Resource_Center/Articles/Articles/Dodd_Frank.pdf [hereinafter
EISNERAMPER SURVEY]; Press Release, Hofstra Univ., Dodd-Frank Drives Investor
Acceptance of Hedge Fund Model, New Survey Reports (Apr. 12, 2012) (on file with
author) (“[M]ost hedge funds surveyed expect their operational cost will rise due to
increased costs of the regulations found in the Dodd-Frank bill.”); see also Jón
Daníelsson et al., Highwaymen or Heroes: Should Hedge Funds Be Regulated—
A Survey, 1 J. FIN. STABILITY 522, 523 (2005) (expressing concern over the potential effects of
regulation); Mohamed Gaber et al., Funds of Hedge Funds: Ethics of This Black Box
Strategy, 9 PENSIONS 328, 328 (2004) (“As providers of absolute returns, hedge funds are
less regulated by the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) than US mutual
funds.”); Michael R. King & Philipp Maier, Hedge Funds and Financial Stability:
Regulating Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 6 J. FIN. STABILITY 283, 284,
293 (2009) (arguing against increased regulation of hedge funds); Houman B. Shadab,
The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, REGULATION, Spring 2007, at 36, 41 (2007).
2. Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin.
Servs., 105th Cong. 26 (1998) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve
Board) (repeating Greenspan’s support for continued loose regulation of the hedge fund
industry); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF
HEDGE FUNDS 90 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf (“Many of those opposing required
registration expressed a strong preference for leaving the hedge fund industry
‘unregulated.’ They argued that the incidence of fraud among hedge fund advisers is
low, and that hedge funds are adequately supervised by prime brokers, auditors and
lenders. Some asserted that there would be no purpose in requiring registration, arguing
that the types of clients investing in hedge funds are able to take steps to protect
themselves without the assistance of the Commission.” (footnotes omitted)); Stephen
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With the success and the proliferation of the hedge fund industry,
retail investors increasingly gained access to hedge funds,3 and hedge
fund fraud increased.4 Several spectacular hedge fund failures5 seemed

Brown et al., Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund
Registration, 63 J. FIN. 2785, 2789 (2008) (stating that when the SEC tried to change
registration rules in 2004, the changes were strongly opposed by hedge fund managers,
“who argued that completing the 35-page form was unnecessarily costly and
burdensome”); Carol J. Loomis, Hard Times Come to the Hedge Funds, FORTUNE, Jan.
1970, at 100, 100 (stating that the threat of SEC action was viewed as a deterrent to
growth, and hedge fund managers in the 1960s and 1970s disliked the thought of SEC
regulation, dreading the “prospect of an SEC move that would prevent them from
earning their compensation in the traditional way”).
3. See generally Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation,
and Investor Suitability, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 581 (2009).
4. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (eliminating section
203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act), the private adviser
exemption); Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
76 Fed. Reg. 42,950, 42,963–64, 42,982 (July 19, 2011) (“[W]e believe the public
reporting requirements we are adopting will provide a level of transparency that will help
us to identify practices that may harm investors, will aid investors in conducting their
own due diligence, and will deter advisers’ fraud and facilitate earlier discovery of
potential misconduct. . . . [T]hese reports will create a publicly accessible foundation of
basic information that could aid investors and prospective investors in conducting due
diligence and could further help investors and other industry participants protect against
fraud.” (footnotes omitted)); Whittier, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2637, 91
SEC Docket 1161, at 2 (Aug. 21, 2007) (settling an action against hedge fund manager
for, among other things, misrepresenting to fund investors that a particular auditor
audited certain hedge funds, when in fact it did not); Registration Under the Advisers
Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,059 (Dec. 10, 2004)
(requiring fund advisers to register under the Advisers Act so that the Commission could
gather “basic information about hedge fund advisers and the hedge fund industry,”
“oversee hedge fund advisers,” and “deter or detect fraud by unregistered hedge fund
advisers”); 2003 SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 2, at xi, 2, 72–75 (finding that the
hedge fund industry as a whole lacks fraud protection and disclosure requirements and
that the hedge fund industry allows for overleveraging and the retailization of hedge
funds to investors); Majed R. Muhtaseb & Chun Chun “Sylvia” Yang, Portraits of Five
Hedge Fund Fraud Cases, 15 J. FIN. CRIME 179 (2008) (identifying and extensively
investigating fraud committed by hedge funds); Franklin R. Edwards, New Proposals To
Regulate Hedge Funds: SEC Rule 203(b)(3)-2, at 2 (Columbia Univ. APEC Study Ctr.,
Discussion Paper No. 35, 2004), available at http://www7.gsb.columbia.edu/apec/sites/
default/files/discussion/35EdwardsHedge.pdf (examining the Commission’s new proposal
to address its current concerns about hedge funds, rule 203(b)(3)-2, which would require
the registration of most advisers to hedge funds with the SEC); Press Release, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act Amendments to Investment Advisers
Act (June 22, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-133.htm (“These
reporting requirements are designed to help identify practices that may harm investors,
deter advisers’ fraud, and facilitate earlier discovery of potential misconduct.”).
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to confirm that the failure of systematically important hedge funds could
have the potential to create such uncertainty as to impede trading, and in
a worst case scenario, could cause damage to the real economy.6 The
combination of these factors, among others, resulted in an unparalleled
effort by regulators to increase the supervision of hedge funds.7
5. Massive hedge fund failures include Amaranth Advisors, with the most
significant loss of value, Bailey Coates, Cromwell Fund, Marin Capital, Aman Capital,
Tiger Funds, and Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), the most famous hedge
fund collapse. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000) (providing an in-depth look at LTCM’s
collapse); PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 10–25 (1999), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf (discussing
the LTCM incident and recommending a number of measures to constrain excessive
leverage); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS
NEED TO FOCUS GREATER ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC RISK (1999) (reviewing LTCM’s
“near-collapse”); Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 189 (1999) (exploring the policy implications
of LTCM’s collapse); King & Maier, supra note 1, at 288 (“Prominent victims of
funding illiquidity are LTCM, Amaranth Advisors, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
In all cases, their asset positions had a positive mark-to-market value, but they were
unable to meet margin calls.”); René M. Stulz, Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future,
21 J. ECON. PERSP. 175, 188 (2007) (“[T]he Amaranth losses led to calls for regulation of
hedge funds.”); Linda Chatman Thomsen et al., Hedge Funds: An Enforcement Perspective,
39 RUTGERS L.J. 541, 545–47 (2008) (describing LTCM’s “meltdown”); Joseph G.
Haubrich, Some Lessons on the Rescue of Long-Term Capital Management (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Paper No. 19, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=987558 (reviewing the restructuring and recapitalization of LTCM).
6. Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk in the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Rep. Spencer Bauchus); id.
at 8 (statement of E. Gerald Corrigan, Managing Director, Goldman Sachs & Company);
Jón Daníelsson & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Regulating Hedge Funds, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV.
29, 30 (2007) (“Hedge funds do . . . contribute to systemic risk whereby the failure of a
systemically important hedge fund has the potential to create sufficient uncertainty in the
markets for liquidity to dry up and for trading to cease with potentially costly
consequences.”); Tomas Garbaravicius & Frank Dierick, Hedge Funds and Their
Implications for Financial Stability 27 (Eur. Cent. Bank Occasional Paper Series, Paper
No. 34, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=752094
(“The near-collapse of LTCM . . . underscores how hedge fund activities can harm
financial institutions and markets.”); Jim Geene, Defining Hedge Funds: Regulations and
Strategies in Mature and Emerging Markets 12 (June 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641592 (“After the fall of LTCM, it became clear
that unregulated hedge funds come with risks. LTCM caused financial problems to
investors and the whole financial system was in danger.”); Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic
Risk and Hedge Funds, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (Mar. 2005), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w11200 (“[S]ince the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, it has
become clear that hedge funds are also involved in systemic risk exposures. The hedgefund industry has a symbiotic relationship with the banking sector, and many banks now
operate proprietary trading units that are organized much like hedge funds. As a result,
the risk exposures of the hedge fund industry may have a material impact on the banking
sector, resulting in new sources of systemic risks.”).
7. See Geene, supra note 6, at 12; see also Loomis, supra note 2, at 100
(discussing previous efforts to regulate hedge funds); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed.
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Since the proliferation of the hedge fund industry in the 1980s, the
SEC had repeatedly attempted to register hedge fund advisers.8 The
SEC made its last attempt in 2004 to require registration of hedge fund
advisers,9 but two years later the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia vacated the registration rule, finding it “arbitrary”
in Goldstein v. SEC.10 Although the vast majority of hedge fund advisers
had registered under the SEC’s registration requirements, they immediately
deregistered after the Goldstein decision.11 The advisers’ decision to
deregister in 2006 seems to confirm the industry’s opposition to registration
and disclosure requirements.
The role of hedge funds in global financial markets was again
highlighted in the global financial crisis of 2008–2009.12 Some studies

Reserve Bd., Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets
Conference: Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20060516a.htm (“Following the LTCM
crisis and the publication of the Working Group’s recommendations, the debate about
hedge funds and the broader effects of their activities on financial markets abated for a
time. That debate, however, has now resumed with vigor—spurred, no doubt, by the
creation of many new funds, large reported inflows to funds, and a broadening investor
base. Renewed discussion of hedge funds and of their benefits and risks has in turn led
to calls for authorities to implement new policies, many of which will be topics of this
conference. . . . Authorities’ primary task is to guard against a return of the weak market
discipline that left major market participants overly vulnerable to market shocks.
Continued focus on counterparty risk management is likely the best course for
addressing systemic concerns related to hedge funds.”).
8. See infra Part II.
9. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279); see also Troy
A. Paredes, On the Decision To Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy,
Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 976; infra Part II.
10. Oesterle, supra note 1, at 41 (citing Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir.
2006)).
11. See Is Deregistration as an Adviser with U.S. SEC an Option?: 1 February
2007 Deadline Approaches, DECHERT (Jan. 2007), http://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/
882b5c5a-7fc0-4d48-9553-90939b1607e0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/444d917
d-420b-4d0c-b037-91e8fe9d6780/FSissue2De-Registrationpdf.pdf (“[M]any hedge fund
advisers that registered with the SEC have already deregistered, and others are now
contemplating deregistration.”).
12. Maria Strömqvist, Hedge Funds and Financial Crises, 1 ECON. REV. 87, 89–90
(2009), available at http://www.riksbank.se/upload/Dokument_riksbank/Kat_publicerat/
PoV_sve/eng/stromqvist2009_1_eng.pdf (“The high degree of leverage entails risks for the
counterparties of the hedge funds (for example the lenders) and the failure of a fund may
therefore have contagion effects in the financial system.”); Photis Lysandrou, The Real
Role of Hedge Funds in the Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2012, 6:55 AM), http://www.ft.
com/cms/s/0/e83f9c52-6910-11e1-9931-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1zmj84oze (registration
required) (“Had it not been for hedge funds’ intermediary position between the investors

247

suggest that hedge funds may have a destabilizing effect on financial
markets.13 Others point out that hedge funds were not identifiable as the
culprits for the financial crisis.14 Despite the mixed evidence, regulators
seeking yield on the one hand and the banks that created the high yielding securities on
the other, the supply of these securities, known as collateralised debt obligations, would
never have reached the proportions that were critical in precipitating the near collapse of
the whole financial system.”).
13. See, e.g., Tobias Adrian et al., Hedge Fund Tail Risk, in QUANTIFYING
SYSTEMIC RISK 155, 155 (Joseph G. Haubrich & Andrew W. Lo eds., 2013) (“While
hedge funds are liquidity providers in usual times, during times of market crisis, they can
be forced to delever, potentially contributing to market volatility.”); Photis Lysandrou,
The Primacy of Hedge Funds in the Subprime Crisis, 34 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 225,
227 (2012) (“Take away hedge funds and a general financial crisis could still have
occurred in 2007–8, but it is only because of the hedge funds that the crisis that actually
occurred initially took on the . . . form of a subprime crisis.”); Garbaravicius & Dierick,
supra note 6, at 27 (“The near-collapse of LTCM . . . underscores how hedge fund
activities can harm financial institutions and markets. A sequence of negative events can
start with losses on leveraged market positions. Liquidity shortages then come into play,
which are further exacerbated by asset illiquidity in stressed markets. Thus, leveraged
market risk can, if not supported by adequate liquidity reserves or borrowing capacity,
force a fund to default on its obligations to prime brokers and other financial institutions.
The spill-over effect on markets depends on the fund’s size and the relative importance
of its positions in certain markets.”); John Kambhu et al., Hedge Funds, Financial
Intermediation, and Systemic Risk 11–12 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No.
291, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1003210
(“If systemic risk is fundamentally about financial markets linkages to the real economy,
then hedge funds create systemic risk to the extent that they can disrupt the ability of
financial intermediaries or financial markets to efficiently provide credit. . . . [B]anks’
direct exposure to hedge funds has been growing proportionately with the hedge fund
industry itself.”); Andrew W. Lo, Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis
of 2007–2008: Written Testimony Prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s November 13, 2008 Hearing on
Hedge Funds 10 (Nov. 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301217 (“[O]ver the past decade, these investors
and funds have become central to the global financial system, providing loans, liquidity,
insurance, risk-sharing, and other importan[t] services that used to be the exclusive
domain of banks. But unlike banks—which are highly regulated entities (but less so,
since the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act in 1999), with specific capital adequacy
requirements and leverage and risk constraints—hedge funds and their investors are
relatively unconstrained. . . . [Hedge funds] can also cause market dislocation in
crowded markets with participants that are not fully aware of or prepared for the
crowdedness of their investments.”).
14. Andrew W. Lo, Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of
2007-2008, 1 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 4, 16 (2009) (“While the shadow banking system has
no doubt contributed to systemic risk in the financial industry, hedge funds have played
only a minor role in the current financial crisis, as evidenced by the lack of attention they
have received in the government’s recent bailout efforts.”); Roberta Romano, Against
Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment 3 (Yale Law & Econ., Research Paper
No. 414, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697348
(“[T]here is an absence of evidence pointing to hedge funds as a contributing factor in
the recent financial panic.”); Houman B. Shadab, Hedge Funds and the Financial Crisis
1 (N.Y. Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 09/10 #31, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1564847 (“[H]edge funds did not
cause or meaningfully exacerbate the financial crisis and in fact have reduced its impact
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and commentators demanded greater regulatory oversight of the global
hedge fund industry to improve the stability of global financial markets.15
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) is the latest chapter in the debate on hedge fund
adviser registration. Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Private
Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010 (PFIARA or Title
IV).16 The PFIARA authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules requiring
registration and enhanced disclosure for private equity and hedge funds
managers.17 As part of the new rules, the SEC introduced controversial
reporting obligations that require the disclosure of strategies and products
used by the investment adviser and its funds, performance and changes
in performance, financing information, risks metrics, counterparties and
credit exposure, positions held by the investment adviser, percentage of
assets traded using algorithms, and the percentage of equity and debt,
among others.18
This Article presents the results of the first survey study with hedge
fund advisers after the SEC’s registration effective date. The population
consists of 1267 private fund advisers who registered before the SEC’s
registration effective date for private funds, March 30, 2012. The Author’s
research team contacted the entire population via fax questionnaire,
e-mail survey, and interviews. Respondents (n=94) answered questions
in several categories designed to identify the effects of registration and
disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act. The categories

and are helping the economy to recover.”); Stephen Brown et al., Hedge Funds After
Dodd-Frank, NYU STERN SCH. BUS. (July 19, 2010, 3:41 PM), http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/
blogs/regulatingwallstreet/2010/07/hedge-funds-after-doddfrank.html (assessing hedge
funds’ noncontribution to systemic risk in general and during the recent crisis).
15. Robert J. Bianchi & Michael E. Drew, Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic
Risk, 19 GRIFFITH L. REV. 6, 16–25 (2010); Oesterle, supra note 1, at 13; Geene, supra
note 6, at 2; Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the
Hedgeworld Fund Services Conference: Hedge Fund Regulation on the Horizon—Don’t
Shoot the Messenger (June 18, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2009/spch061809laa.htm.
16. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 401, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570 (2010).
17. Id. §§ 402–408.
18. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 2048 (12-11), FORM PF, REPORTING FORM FOR
INVESTMENT ADVISERS TO PRIVATE FUNDS AND CERTAIN COMMODITY POOL OPERATORS
AND COMMODITY TRADING ADVISORS [hereinafter FORM PF], available at http://www.
sec.gov/about/forms/formpf.pdf; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 1707 (09-11), FORM ADV,
UNIFORM APPLICATION FOR INVESTMENT ADVISER REGISTRATION AND REPORT BY
EXEMPT REPORTING ADVISERS [hereinafter FORM ADV], available at http://www.sec.
gov/about/forms/formadv.pdf.
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included, among others, compliance measures, strategic responses, longterm effect of reporting and disclosure rules on private funds, long-term
effect of reporting and disclosure rules on the private fund industry, cost
of compliance, effect of the regulatory regime on assets under management,
and effect of the regulatory regime on profitability.
Part I of this Article introduces the issue of hedge fund registration
and the tension between regulators and the hedge fund industry regarding
the appropriate level of regulatory oversight. After a short introduction
of historical attempts to register hedge fund managers, Part II describes
the legal requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act pertaining to hedge fund
managers. Over fifty years of low-level regulatory oversight for the hedge
fund industry came to an end with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Part III outlines the methodological approach of the survey study. It
introduces the survey instrument, data sources, sampling, coding,
and coding constraints, and evaluates possible selection bias issues. Part IV
discusses the results of the survey study with descriptive statistics, and Part
V presents the substantive results of the study in summary graphs. Part
VI summarizes the key findings and discusses implications for hedge fund
policy. It also evaluates limitations of the survey study and possible
implications for future research.
II. HEDGE FUND OVERSIGHT
Securities regulation in the United States has traditionally not emphasized
hedge fund oversight. To restore public trust in capitalism after the 1929
depression, Roosevelt’s New Deal included comprehensive securities
regulations.19 Although the New Deal securities regulation established
the legal basis for modern securities regulation,20 the drafters considered
sophisticated investors investing their own funds capable of fending for
themselves with no need for the protection of the securities laws.21

19. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 3 (1970).
20. Id. Roosevelt’s New Deal established the Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No.
73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (1982 & Supp. IV
1987)); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1987)); the Investment
Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987)); and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1
to -21 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987)).
21. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 41
(1982); James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 29, 37 (1959).
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The drafters also considered the sale of securities to a limited group of
experienced investors beyond the reach of the federal government.22
Accordingly, hedge fund regulation in the United States was historically
based mostly on compliance with accredited investor standards23 in
combination with exemptions for hedge fund advisers.24 Before the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010,25 hedge funds were able to
remain exempt from the securities laws as long as they limited the sale
of their securities to a limited number of accredited investors, limited the

22. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953); Landis, supra
note 21, at 37. Companies selling securities to sophisticated investors, as defined by
investor wealth, can be exempt from securities regulations if they comply with statutory
requirements. See, e.g., Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2012). The
Securities Act distinguishes between public and private offerings and provides
exemptions for transactions not involving a public offering, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006),
and sales of securities other than those made by an issuer, underwriter, or dealer,
Securities Act § 4(1).
23. See Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125 (holding that investors who met the
Regulation D criteria qualified to invest in hedge funds because they could “fend for
themselves”); 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (defining the term “accredited investor” as
a natural person whose individual net worth exceeded $1 million at the time of the
purchase, or whose individual income exceeded $200,000 in each of the two most recent
years and who had a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the
year of investment). After its attempt to require hedge fund registration and its
subsequent defeat in Goldstein, the SEC, in August 2007, dramatically expanded fraud
protection for investors. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled
Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,756, 44,757 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 275) (“The rule prohibits advisers from (i) making false or misleading
statements to investors or prospective investors in hedge funds and other pooled
investment vehicles they advise, or (ii) otherwise defrauding these investors. The rule
clarifies that an adviser’s duty to refrain from fraudulent conduct under the federal
securities laws extends to the relationship with ultimate investors and that the
Commission may bring enforcement actions under the Advisers Act against investment
advisers who defraud investors or prospective investors in those pooled investment
vehicles.”); Prohibition of Fraud by Advisors to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles;
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 404
(proposed Dec. 26, 2006) (to be codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 275)
(reasoning that “natural persons may have indirect exposure to private pools” and “many
individual investors today may be eligible to make investments in privately offered
investment pools as accredited investors that previously may not have qualified as such
for those investments”).
24. See Advisers Act § 203(b) (providing broader registration requirement exemptions
for hedge fund advisers than the Dodd-Frank Act).
25. See infra Part II.B.
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resale of their securities, and did not advertise or otherwise hold themselves
out to the public.26
The collapse of large hedge funds such as Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) in 1998,27 Amaranth in 2006,28 and others29
highlighted the potential systemic risks posed by the industry.30 In 2008
and 2009, the hedge fund industry was blamed for taking excessive risks
that contributed to the financial crisis.31 The systemic risk of hedge

26. See Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L LAW 389, 412–16 (2011) (summarizing hedge fund regulation before the
Dodd-Frank Act). Hedge funds, for the most part, limited the sale of their securities to
accredited investors to remain exempt from registration and supervision. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a)(5) (providing a safe harbor under § 4(2) of the Securities Act and defining
an “accredited investor” as a person with a net worth of more than $1 million). The SEC
proposed amending Regulation D, noting that inflation might have eroded the
significance of a $1 million net worth as a proxy for investor sophistication. See
Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited
Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. at 405 (proposing two
steps for determining whether an investors would be accredited: (1) whether the
individual meets the test in rule 501(a) or rule 215 and (2) whether the individual “owns
at least $2.5 million in investments”). But see Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to
Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,756 n.2 (deferring consideration
of proposed change to definition of “accredited investor”).
27. See sources cited supra notes 5–6; see also Philippe Jorion, Risk Management
Lessons from Long-Term Capital Management, 6 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 277 (2000) (drawing
risk management lessons from LTCM); Paul N. Roth & Brian H. Fortune, Hedge Fund
Regulation in the Aftermath of Long-Term Capital Management, in HEDGE FUNDS: LAW
AND REGULATION 83 (Iain Cullen & Helen Parry eds., 2001) (describing the industry
response to LTCM’s collapse).
28. See sources cited supra notes 5–6; see also Ludwig B. Chincarini, The Amaranth
Debacle: A Failure of Risk Measures or a Failure of Risk Management?, J. ALTERNATIVE
INVESTMENT, Winter 2007, at 91 (analyzing “the causes and details of the collapse of
Amaranth”).
29. Other massive hedge fund failures included Bailey Coates, Bayou Management,
Cromwell Fund, Philadelphia Alternative Asset Management, Marin Capital, Aman
Capital Global, Tiger Funds, Eifuku Master Trust, Lyceum Capital, and Wood River
Partners. See MARK JICKLING & ALISON A. RAAB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33746,
HEDGE FUND FAILURES 5–9 (2006).
30. See sources cited supra notes 6, 13; see also Regulation of Hedge Funds:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 31
(2006) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC) (“[H]ad the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York not intervened to organize a $3.6 billion bailout by the fund’s
creditor banks, the bankruptcy of LTCM ‘could have potentially impaired the economies
of many nations, including our own.’”); Kaal, supra note 3, at 628 (“Regulators could be
inclined to argue that market failure in financial instruments precipitated systemic
risk.”).
31. 155 CONG. REC. H14,441–42 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Sheila
Jackson-Lee) (“[The Dodd-Frank Act will] provide[] more transparency and tougher
regulation of hedge funds, private equity firms, and credit rating agencies, whose seal of
approval gave way to excessively risky practices that led to a financial collapse.”); Kaal,
supra note 26, at 391 (“Hedge funds have been blamed for their part in the crisis and . . .
for the problems affecting many aspects of financial markets.” (footnotes omitted));
America’s Stockmarket Plunge: A Few Minutes of Mayhew, ECONOMIST, May 15, 2010,
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funds in combination with increasing hedge fund adviser fraud32 and the
retailization of the hedge fund industry33 led to increasing demands for a
heightened level of supervision for the hedge fund industry.34 In 2004,
the SEC changed the rules to, in effect, register hedge fund advisers.35
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the registration requirement
for hedge fund advisers in 2006.36 The hedge fund registration and
disclosure requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act increase oversight and
appear to resolve the tension between the industry and the regulators.37
A. Attempts To Register Hedge Funds
Since the inception of the hedge fund industry,38 the appropriate level
of oversight has been a balancing act to satisfy the demands of the

at 82, 82, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16113270 (“Another factor [in
the debate] was the sudden retreat by the ‘high frequency’ firms whose algorithmic
trading has come to dominate equity markets.”).
32. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 72,054, 72,078 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279)
(“Registration allows us to conduct examinations of hedge fund advisers, and our
examinations provide a strong deterrent to advisers’ fraud, identify practices that may
harm investors, and lead to earlier discovery of fraud that does occur.”).
33. Id. at 72,058 (“Investors that have not been traditional hedge fund investors,
including pension plans that have millions of beneficiaries, are thus today purchasing
hedge funds. As a result of the participation by these entities in hedge funds, the assets
of these entities are exposed to the risks of hedge fund investing. Losses resulting from
hedge fund investing and hedge fund frauds may affect the entities’ obligations to their
beneficiaries or pursue other intended purposes.”); see also Hearing on the Nomination
of William H. Donaldson, of New York, To Be a Member of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 108th
Cong. 1, 37 (2003) (statement of William H. Donaldson), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg90929/pdf/CHRG-108shrg90929.pdf (describing the
retailization of hedge funds as a “distressing move”); Kaal, supra note 3 (discussing the
phenomenon of retailization). But see 2003 SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 2, at
80 (“[T]he staff has not uncovered evidence of significant numbers of retail investors
investing directly in hedge funds.”).
34. See, e.g., 2003 SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 2, at 77, 80; Oesterle,
supra note 1, at 1 (“Pressure is mounting to control hedge funds, managed pools of
private money that use very sophisticated trading strategies in securities, currencies, and
derivatives.”).
35. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
36. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
37. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
38. See generally Carol J. Loomis, The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With, FORTUNE,
Apr. 1966, at 237 (describing the hedge fund model of Alfred Winslow Jones and
introducing the concept to the investing community); Loomis, supra note 2 (discussing
the history of hedge funds); Julie Rohrer, The Red-Hot World of Julian Robertson,
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industry for lower levels of oversight against the need for investor
protection. With the emergence of the Jones hedge fund model in late
1949,39 the hedge fund industry evolved without significant regulatory
oversight.40 In 1968, the SEC’s first official action against a hedge fund
came in the investigation of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith for
alleged misuse of inside information.41 Because of hedge funds’ alleged
impact on the markets in the 1969 bear market, the SEC started to consider

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1986, at 86 (reintroducing investors to the potential of
hedge funds).
39. FRANCOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HEDGE FUNDS: MYTHS AND LIMITS 7 (2002);
Stulz, supra note 5, at 176; Peter Landau, Alfred Winslow Jones: The Long and Short of
the Founding Father, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1968, at 1; Lawrence C. Strauss, The
Legacy, BARRON’S, May 31, 2004, at 2; Alan Rappeport, A Short History of Hedge Funds,
CFO.COM (Mar. 27, 2007), http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8914091/c_8913455; see also
Ted Caldwell, “Jones Model Funds”: LMC’s Recommended Classification Name,
LOOKOUT M OUNTAIN H EDGE F UND R EV ., 4th Quarter 1995, at 1, available at
http://www.jones model.info/pdf/jones_model_named_Q4_95.pdf (describing the Jones
Model); Alfred Winslow Jones, Fashions in Forecasting, FORTUNE, Mar. 1949, at 88
(providing Jones’s thoughts on the new methods of market analysis); Loomis, supra note
38 (describing Jones’s hedge fund model); Measuring Market Risk, A.W. JONES,
http://www.awjones.com/measuringmarketrisk.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (giving an
excerpt from the 1961 Basic Report to the Limited Partners of the firm, describing in
detail the measurement and management of market risk).
40. See sources cited supra note 2; see also Franklin R. Edwards & Stav Gaon,
Hedge Funds: What Do We Know?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2003, at 58, 58 (“While
hedge funds have been around since at least the 1940s, . . . [g]overnment regulators . . .
have become increasingly interested in hedge funds, especially since the muchpublicized collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in August 1998.”);
William Fung & David A. Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 309,
309 (1999) (“For over half a century of its existence, the hedge fund industry has stayed
opaque to the general investing public.”); Stulz, supra note 5, at 175 (“Hedge funds are
mostly unregulated.”); Rory B. O’Halloran, Comment, An Overview and Analysis of
Recent Interest in Increased Hedge Fund Regulation, 79 TUL. L. REV. 461, 462 (2004)
(“Hedge funds, though historically very secretive and lightly regulated, have recently
been cast into the spotlight once again by the media, the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the New York State Attorney General.”).
41. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 31680, [1967–1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,596 (Aug. 26, 1968);
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 937 (1968) (settling
with Merrill Lynch and establishing the “Chinese Wall”); see also Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1974) (allowing private
suit against Merrill Lynch and its clients by stock purchasers to proceed); In re Investors
Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971), available at http://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/1971/349267.pdf (reviewing censures against investors who sold stock based on Merrill Lynch’s
inside information); Loomis, supra note 2, at 139 (describing SEC’s investigation and its
ramifications); Merrill Lynch Firm, Others Cited in SEC Action, SEC NEWS DIG., Aug.
27, 1968, at 1, 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1968/dig082768.pdf
(“The SEC has ordered administrative proceedings under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 involving the New York broker-dealer firm of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., fourteen of its officers and salesmen and fifteen institutional investors.”).
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ways to bring hedge funds under its regulatory authority.42 Initially, the
SEC opined that hedge funds are “dealers” in securities and could require
registration under the Securities Exchange Act.43 However, the SEC
continued to provide guidance mostly in the form of no-action letters to
help investment advisers determine the counting of clients to stay exempt
from securities regulation.44 Courts also provided very limited and
sometimes contradictory guidance.45
42. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 35TH ANNUAL REPORT 18 (1969), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1969.pdf; Loomis, supra note 2, at 100.
43. Hugh F. Owens, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the North
American Securities Administrators Association: A Regulator Looks at Some Unregulated
Investment Companies—The Exotic Funds 3–4 (Oct. 21, 1969), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/1969/102169owens.pdf (suggesting that the SEC’s staff
might view the typical hedge fund as a dealer within the meaning of section 3(a)(5) of
the Securities Exchange Act); see also Robert C. Hacker & Ronald D. Rotunda, SEC
Registration of Private Investment Partnerships After Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1978) (“A typical hedge fund partnership could conceivably be
regarded as a ‘dealer,’ because it regularly buys and sells securities for its own account.
Similarly, the manager of a hedge fund partnership could be viewed as a ‘broker,’
because he regularly effects securities transactions for the account of the partnership.”);
Loomis, supra note 2, at 140 (describing SEC staff attempts to define hedge funds as
dealers).
44. To remain exempt from securities regulation, investment advisers were
required to determine which clients qualified as a client for purposes of the securities
laws. See Ruth Levine, SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2719, at *2–3
(Dec. 15, 1976); David Shilling, SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 865,
at *1–4 (Apr. 3, 1976); B.J. Smith, SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
2642, at *1–2 (Dec. 25, 1975); S.S. Programs, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 599, at *6–7 (Oct. 17, 1974); Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2154, at *3 (Apr. 25, 1974); Hawkeye
Bancorporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1971 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 883, at *2 (June 11,
1971). International financial institutions with operations in the United States also
structured their operations to meet U.S. regulatory requirements relying on SEC noaction letters under which a U.S. subsidiary and a non-U.S. parent are separate entities
for the purpose of the registration requirements under U.S. securities law. See, e.g.,
Royal Bank of Can. et al., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 620, at *8–
10 (June 3, 1998); ABN AMRO Bank N.V. et al., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 754, at *10–11 (July 1, 1997); Murray Johnstone Holdings Ltd. et al., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 734, at *4–5 (Oct. 7, 1994); Kleinwort Benson
Inv. Mgmt. Ltd. et al., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1181 (Dec. 15,
1993); Mercury Asset Mgmt. PLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
652, at *3–7 (Apr. 6, 1993); Uniao de Bancos de Brasileiros S.A., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 817, at *5–10 (July 28, 1992); see also Janie Casello
Bouges, Why the SEC’s First Attempt at Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Failed, J.
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, Winter 2006, at 89, 92 (“Confusion existed before the
adoption of the ‘safe harbor’ when the SEC staff issued numerous no-action letters that
required an investment adviser to look through and count each individual advisee or
member as a separate client.”); Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory
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Finally, in 1985, the SEC adopted the investment adviser registration
safe harbor rule under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers
Act).46 For purposes of an exemption from registration under the Advisers
Act, the safe harbor allowed a limited partnership, rather than each of its
limited partners, to be counted as a “client” of a general partner acting as
investment adviser to the partnership.47 Justifying the rule, the SEC
reasoned that if an investment adviser manages an investment pool on
the basis of the investment objectives of its participants as a group, the
entire pool should be viewed as the adviser’s client rather than each
participant.48 The rule was aimed at providing investment advisers with
greater certainty in determining when they may rely on the safe harbor.49
The SEC broadened the scope of the rule in 1997 by including other
entities used by investment advisers to pool client assets.50 While the

Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 921, 966–67 (1998) (contending that mere reliance on SEC no-action
letters led to significant legal uncertainty for the hedge fund industry and that the
investing public’s reliance on SEC no-action letters creates problems for courts).
45. See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 869–71 (2d Cir. 1977)
(stating that general partners of limited partnerships investing in securities were
investment advisers but leaving unanswered the question of whether the partnership or
each of the partners should be counted as clients), overruled on other grounds by
Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (stating that the
Advisers Act confers a limited private remedy to void an investment contract but does
not confer any other private causes of action, legal or equitable); see also Hacker &
Rotunda, supra note 43, at 1484 (describing the Abrahamson court’s failure to address
the registration issue).
46. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 (1986); see also Advisers Act, Pub. L. No. 76768, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1987)); Definition of “Client” of an Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes
Relating to Limited Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg. 29,206, 29,206 (July 18, 1985) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275) (defining a single client for purposes of § 203(b)(3)-1 as a
limited partnership to which investment advice is provided based on the objectives of the
limited partnership rather than the individual objectives of the limited partners, thereby
resolving the question of whether advisers to unregistered investment pools were
required to look through the pools to count each investor as a client or could count each
pool as a single client).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(b)(1) (“A limited partnership shall be counted as a
client of any general partner or other person acting as investment adviser to the
partnership . . . .”).
48. Definition of “Client” of Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes Relating to
Limited Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg. 8740, 8741 (proposed Mar. 5, 1985).
49. Definition of “Client” of an Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes Relating
to Limited Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg. at 29,206; Bouges, supra note 44, at 92; Roberta S.
Karmel, Regulation by Exemption: The Changing Definition of an Accredited Investor,
39 RUTGERS L. REV. 681, 695 n.90 (2008).
50. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 62
Fed. Reg. 28,112, 28,124 (May 22, 1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279)
(allowing an investment adviser to count a legal organization as a single client under rule
203(b)(3)-1(a)(2)(i), provided the investment advice is based on the objectives of the
legal organization instead of the individual investment objectives of any owner(s) of the
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1985 rule permitted advisers to count each partnership, trust, or corporation
as a single client, the 1997 rule expanded the rule to cover other legal
entities.51 Specifically, investment advisers were allowed to count a legal
organization as a single client provided the investment advice was based
on the objectives of the legal organization rather than the individual
investment objectives of any owners of the legal organization.52 This
safe harbor allowed investment advisers to manage large amounts of
securities indirectly for several hundreds of investors in several hedge
funds.53
After the fall of LTCM in 1998 and its bailout orchestrated by the
New York Federal Reserve Bank,54 it became increasingly apparent that
hedge funds could pose risks that may affect international markets.
Concerns over excessive leverage by hedge funds and a lack of
transparency led to increasing demands for new regulation.55 Central
banks, regulatory agencies, and international “regulatory” committees
conducted studies to determine if hedge funds posed a risk to the global
financial system.56 Many of these studies concluded that there was a
legal entity). Before the SEC adopted this rule, it was largely unclear whether advisers
to unregistered investment pools were required to count each pool as a single client or
whether they had to look through the pools to count each investor as a client. Registration
Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, 45,181
(proposed July 28, 2004).
51. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 62
Fed. Reg. at 28,124; Definition of “Client” of an Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes
Relating to Limited Partnership, 50 Fed. Reg. at 29,206.
52. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 62
Fed. Reg. at 28,124.
53. See Definition of “Client” of an Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes
Relating to Limited Partnership, 50 Fed. Reg. at 29,206 (defining “client” of an
investment adviser for purposes of the Advisers Act).
54. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 200–04 (discussing the policy implications of
the LTCM rescue by the Federal Reserve); see also sources cited supra note 5.
55. Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV.
681, 681–82 (2000); Oesterle, supra note 1, at 31; Robert C. Pozen, Opinion, Hedge
Funds Today: To Regulate or Not?, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2005, at A14.
56. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANKS’ INTERACTIONS
WITH HIGHLY LEVERAGED INSTITUTIONS (1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs45.pdf; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION & TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L
ORGS. OF SEC. COMMS., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF TRADING AND
DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS AND SECURITIES FIRMS (1999), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs48.pdf; COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., A REVIEW OF FINANCIAL
MARKET EVENTS IN AUTUMN 1998 (1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs12.
pdf; C OUNTERPARTY R ISK M GMT . P OLICY G RP ., I MPROVING C OUNTERPARTY RISK
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (1999), available at http://archives.financialservices.house.
gov/banking/62499crm.pdf; FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
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need for greater disclosure by hedge funds to increase transparency and
enhance market discipline.57
Eventually, in December 2004, the SEC, using its rulemaking authority
under the Advisers Act,58 issued a final rule requiring hedge fund
advisers to register under the Advisers Act.59 The rule was controversial
and strongly opposed by hedge fund advisers.60 Without the private adviser
HIGHLY LEVERAGED INSTITUTIONS (2000), available at http://www.financialstability
board.org/publications/r_0004a.pdf; I NT ’ L S WAPS & D ERIVATIVES A SS ’ N , ISDA 1999
C OLLATERAL R EVIEW (1999), available at http://www.isda.org/press/pdf/colrev99.pdf;
MULTIDISCIPLINARY WORKING GRP. ON ENHANCED DISCLOSURE, FINAL REPORT (2001),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint01.pdf; PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN.
M KTS ., supra note 5; T ECHNICAL C OMM ., I NT ’ L O RG . OF SEC. COMM’NS, ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY STANDARDS ON FUNDS OF HEDGE FUNDS RELATED ISSUES
BASED ON BEST MARKET PRACTICES: FINAL REPORT (2009), available at http://www.
iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD305.pdf; TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC.
COMM’NS, HEDGE FUNDS O VERSIGHT: F INAL R EPORT (2009), available at http://www.
iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf; 2003 SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra
note 2; Transcript of SEC Hedge Fund Roundtable Part 1 (File No. 05-007-03), U.S. SEC.
& E XCH . C OMM ’ N (May 14, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge1
trans.txt; Transcript of SEC Hedge Fund Roundtable Part 2 (File No. 05-007-03), SECS &
EXCH. COMM’N (May 15, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedge funds/hedge2trans.txt.
57. Edwards & Gaon, supra note 40, at 58; see, e.g., FIN. STABILITY FORUM, supra
note 56, at 3.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(a) (2006) (“The Commission [may adopt] . . . rules . . .
necessary or appropriate to the exercise of the functions and powers conferred upon the
Commission elsewhere in this subchapter . . . [and] may classify persons and matters
within its jurisdiction and prescribe different requirements for different classes of
persons or matters”); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(17) (2006) (“The Commission may by rules
and regulations classify, for the purposes of any portion or portions of this subchapter,
persons, including employees controlled by an investment adviser.”).
59. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279) (adopting a
new rule and rule amendments that require advisers of certain private investment pools
to register with the SEC pursuant to the Advisers Act).
60. M ANAGED F UNDS A SS ’ N , T HE SEC F UNDS A SSOCIATION P ROPOSAL : THE
PUBLIC COMMENTARY—A SUMMARY (2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed
/s73004/mfa101804.pdf (“The SEC received 156 letters as of October 13th, 124 of which
were either for or against the proposal. The overwhelming number of the 124 comment
letters that took a position opposed the SEC Proposal . . . 91 letters submitted were
AGAINST the proposal (73%).” (footnote omitted)); Deborah Solomon, SEC Pushing
Proposal To Regulate Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2004, at C4 (“Opinions within
the hedge-fund community are mixed. About 40% of hedge-fund advisers are already
voluntarily registering with the agency, and some hedge funds have said they welcome
regulation to help make their business more sound. But others see it as an unnecessary
intrusion that could lead to further, more invasive regulation down the road. Some of the
strongest dissent is coming from within the SEC, where Commissioners Cynthia
Glassman and Paul Atkins have both expressed concern about hedge-fund regulation.”);
Adam C. Cooper, Chairman, Managed Funds Ass’n, Statement Before the Greenwich
Roundtable 1, 4 (Aug. 19, 2004), available at https://www.managedfunds.org/downloads/
Greenwich_Roundtable_Cooper.pdf (“[I]t remains MFA’s position that the imposition of the
proposed regulatory regime on hedge fund managers will not work to benefit investors or
the global financial markets, and that other, more efficacious means may be employed to
achieve the ends desired. . . . MFA believes that the success and growth of the industry
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exemption, investment advisers were subject to SEC inspections and
bookkeeping and record-keeping requirements.61 Without the private
adviser exemption, hedge funds were also faced with disclosure
requirements 62 and code of ethics requirements63 resulting in significantly
higher legal fees. The industry “argued that completing the 35-page [Form
ADV] was unnecessarily costly and burdensome.”64 Registration also
allowed the SEC “to screen hedge fund advisers for prior convictions or
other professional misconduct.”65
testify to the fact that the current regulatory regime works well. Under the existing
regime, hedge fund managers are subject to a wide variety of direct and indirect regulation,
whether registered or not. . . . This regime reflects a long-standing recognition by Congress
and U.S. regulators that government resources should be devoted to protecting investors
that require protection, rather than those that can look out for themselves.”); Letter from
Richard M. Whiting, Exec. Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/rmwhiting091504.pdf (“[T]here are other, less intrusive
methods to achieve the goals identified by the Commission.”); Comments on Proposed
Rule: Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004.shtml (last modified Mar.
21, 2005); Transcript of SEC Hedge Fund Roundtable Part 1 (File No. 05-007-03), supra
note 56; Transcript of SEC Hedge Fund Roundtable Part 2 (File No. 05-007-03), supra
note 56.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (2012) (stating that investment advisers “shall make and
keep true, accurate and current the following books and records relating to its investment
advisory business”).
62. Id. § 275.204-3 (requiring registered investment advisers to “deliver a brochure
and one or more brochure supplements to each client or prospective client that contains
all information required by Part 2 of Form ADV”).
63. Id. § 275.204A-1 (requiring registered investment advisers to “establish,
maintain and enforce a written code of ethics,” subject to some minimum requirements
included in the rule).
64. Brown et al., supra note 2, at 2789; see also Paul S. Atkins, Protecting
Investors Through Hedge Fund Advisor Registration: Long On Costs, Short On Returns,
25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 537, 541 (2006) (“Now that the rule has been adopted,
its proponents can no longer overlook its flaws, which many of us foresaw. The
application of the registration requirement to hedge fund advisors, for example, has
highlighted information gaps in the existing Form ADV. Form ADV is unlikely to
provide any new information to investors who have performed even the most minimal
level of due diligence about an advisor. Nor does Form ADV provide information that is
particularly helpful for the Commission’s purpose in keeping abreast of hedge fund
activities.”); Gregory Zuckerman, Hedge Funds Brace for Regulation, WALL ST. J., June
8, 2005, at C1; Andrew Harris, SEC Hedge Fund Registration Rule Struck Down by
Court, BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2006, 12:51 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=email_us&refer=home&sid=axTbfV3PhcPg (“Plaintiff Phillip Goldstein, manager
of Pleasantville, New York-based Opportunity Partners LP, argued that the SEC lacked
the authority to regulate hedge funds and failed to take into account compliance costs as
high as $500,000.”); sources cited supra note 60.
65. Oesterle, supra note 1, at 9.
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The rule was issued by a rare three-to-two vote of SEC Commissioners.66
The SEC justified its rulemaking with reference to the growth of the
hedge fund industry in combination with the retailization of the hedge
fund sector, increased hedge fund risk, and financial loss to investors caused
by instances of fraud by hedge fund advisers.67 The SEC cited among the
benefits of this rule more information about hedge fund advisers, the
deterrence of fraud, the curtailment of losses, and improved compliance
controls.68 The SEC argued these positive aspects of its rulemaking would
benefit mutual fund investors, other investors and markets, regulatory
policy, and hedge fund advisers.69
The registration requirement precipitated significant opposition by the
hedge fund industry.70 Eventually, in July 2006, the D.C. Circuit in
Goldstein v. SEC vacated the hedge fund rule as an instance of arbitrary
rulemaking by the SEC.71 Where the term client had not otherwise been
66. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,089–97 (Dec. 10, 2004) (indicating that Commissioners Cynthia A.
Glassman and Paul S. Atkins opposed releasing the final rule). Glassman and Atkins
pointed to the 2003 SEC staff report, which found that retailization was not an issue and
argued that the inflow of funds was so rapid that hedge fund advisers had more to invest
than they could handle and were in no need to solicit retail investors. Id.; see also 2003
SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 2, at 80 (“[T]he staff has not uncovered evidence
of significant numbers of retail investors investing directly in hedge funds.”).
67. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,057–59 (justifying the need for SEC action requiring hedge funds to
register pursuant to the Advisers Act and noting several reasons for broader exposure to
hedge funds in the investing public, including by investors who were previously too risk
averse); 2003 SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 2, at 81 (considering the decrease in
minimum investment requirements and the corresponding increase in risks to small
investors and stating that “[the SEC] ha[d] observed that the minimum qualifications
required to invest in some hedge funds has decreased as newer entrants into the
alternative investments market compete for investors”).
68. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,078 (listing benefits that include a strong deterrent to advisers’ fraud,
identification of practices that may harm investors, earlier discovery of existing fraud,
the ability to screen individuals seeking to advise hedge funds, and to deny entry to those
with a history of disciplinary problems).
69. Id. at 72,078–80.
70. See sources cited supra note 60; see also Editorial, Hedge Funds and the
S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2004, at A20; Hedge-Fund Proposal Troubles Greenspan,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2004, at A6; Hedge Funds: Too Stern a Hand, ECONOMIST, July
17, 2004, at 13; Regulating Hedge Funds: Thorns in the Foliage, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1,
2006, at 61; Deborah Solomon, SEC Wants Hedge Funds in Open, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9,
2004, at C1; Editorial, The SEC’s Expanding Empire, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2004, at
A14; Zuckerman, supra note 64.
71. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (“[T]he Hedge Fund Rule only exacerbates
whatever problems one might perceive in Congress’s method for determining who to
regulate. The Commission’s rule creates a situation in which funds with one hundred or
fewer investors are exempt from the more demanding Investment Company Act, but
those with fifteen or more investors trigger registration under the Advisers Act. This is
an arbitrary rule.”).
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defined in the Advisers Act, the SEC had no authority to determine the
meaning of the term.72 Most hedge fund advisers who had registered
under the registration rule deregistered. After the Goldstein decision, the
SEC proposed an increase for the accredited investor standards under
Regulation D73 and dramatically expanded antifraud protection for
investors.74
B. Dodd-Frank Act Private Fund Rules
As a consequence of the global financial crisis, regulatory oversight of
the global hedge fund industry became again a focus for regulators and
legislatures.75 In an attempt to close regulatory gaps and end the
speculative trading practices that contributed to the 2008 financial
market crisis,76 Congress enacted the PFIARA in Title IV of the DoddFrank Act.77 The Act amends the Advisers Act by establishing rules and
regulations for the registration of private funds with the SEC.78 By
expanding the reporting requirements of private advisers to the SEC,
Title IV is intended to provide greater protections for investors.79

72. Id. at 880–81.
73. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2007).
74. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles;
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (proposed
Jan. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 275) (proposing a new rule to allow
the SEC to bring enforcement actions against investment advisers who defraud investors
or prospective investors of hedge funds).
75. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, §§ 401–416, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570–79
(2010) (incorporating the PFIARA in Title IV); Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending
Directives 2004/39/EC and 2009/…/EC, COM (2009) 207 final (Apr. 30, 2009); Bianchi
& Drew, supra note 15, at 16–25; Geene, supra note 6, at 2; Kaal, supra note 26, at 410–
13; Oesterle, supra note 1, at 13; Alternative Investments, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.
europa.eu/internal_market/investment/alternative_investments_en.htm (last updated Apr. 25,
2013) (providing additional materials on AIFM).
76. See Tom Braithwaite, U.S. Senate Passes Financial Reform, FT.COM (July 16,
2010, 1:01 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6b9d4542-9026-11df-ad26-00144feab49a.
html#axzz2DrwfWezl (“The financial reform legislation approved by Congress today
represents a welcome and far-reaching step toward preventing a replay of the recent
financial crisis.” (quoting Ben Bernanke) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
77. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 401–416.
78. H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 866–67 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111hrpt517/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt517.pdf.
79. Id.
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The Act mandates hedge fund adviser registration to increase record
keeping and disclosure.80 Under the PFIARA, hedge funds with more
than $150 million assets under management (AUM) are required to register
as investment advisers and have to disclose information about their trades
and portfolios to the SEC.81 The Dodd-Frank Act also directs the SEC
to set up rules for the registration and reporting of hedge fund managers
who were previously exempt from registration.82 By registering private
fund advisers, the SEC may collect necessary information to curtail those
who operate in the “shadows of our markets,”83 prevent fraud, limit
systemic risk, and provide information to investors.84
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act also requires registered investment
advisers to maintain records and any other information that may be
necessary and appropriate to avoid systemic risk.85 Advisers are required to
provide confidential reports with respect to certain information related to
systemic risk,86 such as trading practices; trading and investment positions;

80. See Dodd-Frank Act § 408 (“The Commission shall require investment advisers
exempted by reason of this subsection to maintain such records and provide to the
Commission such annual or other reports as the Commission determines necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”).
81. Id. (“The Commission shall provide an exemption from the registration
requirements under this section to any investment adviser of private funds, if each of
such investment adviser acts solely as an adviser to private funds and has assets under
management in the United States of less than $150,000,000.”); see also Dodd-Frank Act
§ 403 (striking private adviser exemption under section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act,
thereby precluding many private fund advisers from avoiding registration); Rules
Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed. Reg.
42,950, 42,955 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279) (“We are
adopting revisions to the instructions to Part 1A of Form ADV to implement a uniform
method for advisers to calculate assets under management that will be used under the Act
for regulatory purposes in addition to assessing whether an adviser is eligible to register
with the Commission.”); Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private
Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign
Private Advisers, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,646, 39,666 (July 6, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 275) (providing an exemption from registration for advisers with less than $150
million in private fund assets under management in the United States); U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV: INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1A, at 6–9 (2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-instructions.pdf (explaining how to calculate
regulatory assets under management); FORM ADV, supra note 18, pt. 1A, at 5 (requiring
exempt reporting advisers to check that they qualify for an exemption from registration:
(i) “as an adviser solely to one or more venture capital funds” or (ii) because they act
“solely as an adviser to private funds and have assets under management in the United
States of less than $150 million”).
82. Dodd-Frank Act § 404.
83. 155 CONG. REC. H14420 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Paul
Kanjorski).
84. 156 CONG. REC. S5925–26 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard
Durbin).
85. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 404–405.
86. Id. § 404(b)(3).
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the amount of AUM; valuation policies; side letters; the use of leverage,
including off-balance sheet leverage; counterparty credit risk exposures;
and other information deemed necessary.87 The PFIARA also makes it
mandatory for registered advisers to maintain records and any other
information the SEC and the systemic risk regulators may deem necessary.88
The legislation was divisive in the drafting process. The legislators
supporting the Dodd-Frank Act wanted the SEC to be able to obtain
sufficient information necessary to protect against systemic risk, prevent
fraud, and provide investors with useful information about the funds,
even funds that are exempt from registration.89 Representatives supporting
the new hedge fund rules maintained that years without regulation
ushered in the financial crisis.90 Others were concerned the exemptions
in Title IV could make the regulation of hedge funds less effective.91
Legislators opposed to the new regulations alleged that the SEC failed to
sufficiently curtail hedge funds under the existing rules92 and argued that
hedge funds did not create systemic risk, played no role in the financial
crisis, and were irrelevant to the financial system as a whole.93
1. Registration
Hedge fund registration rules can be categorized into rules addressing
Dodd-Frank’s exemptions from registration enacted in connection with
its repeal of section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, rules addressing
provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act that delegate responsibility for midsized
investment advisers to state regulatory authorities rather than the SEC,

87. Id.
88. Id. § 404(b)(1)(A).
89. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S5912–13 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Patrick Leahy) (supporting the hedge fund manager registration requirement in
Dodd-Frank). But see id. at S587578 (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby) (questioning
the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act for reducing systemic risk and criticizing its
reliance on massive bureaucracy).
90. 155 CONG. REC. H14,412–13 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Barney Frank); id. at H14,418 (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
91. See 156 CONG. REC. H5235–39 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep.
Paul Kanjorski) (outlining concerns with several of the exemptions).
92. Id.
93. See 156 CONG. REC. S5876 (statement of Sen. Shelby) (“[T]he bill gives the
Securities Exchange and Commission . . . a new systemic risk mandate to oversee
advisers to hedge funds and private equity funds. Yet no one contends private funds
were a cause of the recent crisis or that the demise of any private fund during the crisis
resulted in a systemwide shock.”).
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and amendments to Form ADV implemented by the SEC to reflect the
new registration requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act.
In addition to exempting private fund advisers with less than $150
million AUM from registration,94 the PFIARA provisions of the DoddFrank Act also exempt advisers with less than $100 million AUM who
provide advice to clients on investments other than private funds,95 venture
capital fund advisers,96 and foreign private advisers with fewer than
fifteen clients and investors in the United States.97 Although the entities
that fall under the exemption criteria are not per se required to register,
advisers with less than $150 million AUM have to maintain records and
provide the SEC with annual reports or any other reports that the SEC
deems appropriate or necessary to protect investors.98 To determine the
systemic risk of hedge funds and to impose registration and examination
procedures accordingly, the PFIARA requires the SEC to examine factors
including the investment strategy, size, and governance of an investment
adviser.99 The Dodd-Frank Act also empowers the SEC to utilize its
rulemaking authority to prevent the exemptions from registration to
“swallow the rules.”100
The Dodd-Frank Act created the category of “mid-sized investment
advisers.”101 A midsized adviser is generally defined as an investment
adviser with between $25 and $100 million in AUM that is subject to
registration and examinations with the state in which it maintains its
principal office and place of business. 102 Dodd-Frank delegates
responsibility for midsized investment advisers away from the SEC to
state regulatory authorities.103 Midsized advisers that do not fall under

94. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 408, 124 Stat. 1376, 1575 (2010).
95. Id. § 410.
96. Id. § 407.
97. Id. §§ 402403 (stating that in order to qualify for the exemption, foreign
private advisers cannot have a place of business in the United States, cannot hold
themselves out to the U.S. public as an investment adviser, and cannot have more than
$25 million AUM attributed solely to U.S. clients and investors). But see id. § 402(a)
(allowing the SEC to exercise its rulemaking powers and raise this amount).
98. Id. § 408.
99. Id.
100. 154 CONG. REC. H5238 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Paul
Kanjorski).
101. Dodd-Frank Act § 410 (amending section 203A(a)(2) of the Advisers Act); see
also Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed.
Reg. 42,950, 42,960–61 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279).
102. Dodd-Frank Act § 410.
103. Id.; see also National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-290, § 303, 110 Stat. 3416, 3437 (providing for state regulation of investment
advisers with less than $25 million AUM); Protect Your Money: Check Out Brokers and
Investment Advisers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/brokers.htm
(last modified Jan. 24, 2012); Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
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the SEC registration requirements are instead required to register with
the state securities commissioner or similar agency in the state of their
principle place of business.104 In some states, however, registered advisers
are not subject to examination. The SEC will oversee midsized advisers
in those states that will not provide appropriate oversight.105
Most important for the survey study in this Article, the SEC amended
Form ADV, a disclosure document with periodic amendments, to reflect
the new registration requirements under Dodd-Frank. Any investment
adviser registering with the SEC is required to file Form ADV.106
Investment advisers that were registered with the SEC on January 1,
Address at the NASAA/SEC 19(d) Conference: Advocating for Greater Federal and
State Securities Regulatory Cooperation and Collaboration (May 7, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch050712laa.htm (“The oversight of investment
advisers has always been a partnership between state and federal regulators. Congress
reinforced this when it enacted Section 410 of the Dodd-Frank Act to expand state
authority to include mid-sized investment advisers with $25 million to $100 million in
assets.” (footnotes omitted)).
104. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76
Fed. Reg. at 42,952 (stating that a midsized adviser should determine whether she is
“required to be registered” or “subject to examination” by a state securities authority, by
consulting Item 2.b. of the Instructions for Part 1A of Form ADV); Frequently Asked
Questions Regarding Mid-Sized Advisers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://sec.gov/
divisions/investment/midsizedadviserinfo.htm (last modified June 28, 2011) (stating that
all state securities authorities other than New York and Wyoming have advised the SEC
that advisers registered with them are subject to examination). This is no longer true for
Minnesota. See Investment Advisers: How To Register and Obtain a License in Minnesota,
MINN. DEP’T COM., http://mn.gov/commerce/licensees/Register-a-Security/Requirements
/Investment-Adviser-Requirements.jsp (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
105. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76
Fed. Reg. at 42,952 & n.22 (citing data from the Investment Adviser Registration
Depository and estimating that “approximately 3,200 SEC-registered advisers will be
required to withdraw their registration and register with one or more state securities
authorities”).
106. FORM ADV, supra note 18; see also 17 C.F.R. § 279.1 (2012) (establishing
filing requirements for Form ADV); Michael P. Coakley & Matthew P. Allen, The New
Form ADV Part 2 and the “Plain English” Movement of the SEC, FINRA, and Michigan’s
OFIR, MICH. BUS. L.J., Spring 2001, at 19, 19 (“The SEC requires all investment advisers . . .
registered with the SEC to complete and file a Form ADV with the SEC . . . .”); James F.
Koehler & P. Wesley Lambert, Impact of the Dodd-Frank and Registration Acts of 2010
on Investment Advisers, 13 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 29, 34–35 (2011) (explaining how the rules
require private fund advisers to mail additional disclosures to the SEC); Marybeth
Sorady et al., Summary and Analysis of Dodd-Frank Rules for Investment Advisers:
Registration Requirements, Exemptions, Family Offices, Performance Fee Eligibility, 12
J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 4, 4 (2011) (explaining the rules recently adopted by the
SEC under the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act relating to the increased asset threshold
for federal registration as an investment adviser and “focusing in particular on analyzing
the impact of the Rules on U.S. and non-U.S. advisers to private funds”).
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2012, were required to file the amendment to Form ADV by March 30,
2012.107
Under amended Form ADV, registered investment advisers and exempt
reporting advisers108 are required to report to the SEC information regarding
the private funds they manage.109 The required disclosures include
information regarding the investment strategy, the fund structure,
ownership, the gross asset value, the scope of services provided, and the
fund’s use of consultants and other gatekeepers.110 Another requirement
under amended Form ADV is for registered advisers to disclose the number
and types of their clients, including an assessment of the percentage of
AUM attributable to each client type.111 Nonadvisory activities and
financial industry affiliations also have to be disclosed.
The AUM managed by an adviser determines whether the adviser must
register with the SEC.112 The Advisers Act defined Regulatory Assets
Under Management (RAUM) as “the ‘securities portfolios’ with respect
to which an adviser provides ‘continuous and regular supervisory or
management services.’”113 Under revised Form ADV, advisers must
report their gross RAUM rather than net; this means they will no longer
be able to deduct outstanding debt or other accrued but unpaid liabilities
from their totals.114 To increase consistency, revised Form ADV also gives

107. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-5(b) (2012); see also Rules Implementing Amendments
to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed. Reg. at 42,953–54 (discussing rule
203A-5(b), which provides that SEC-registered advisers not required to file an annual
updating amendment between January 1, 2012, and March 30, 2012, will file an otherthan-annual amendment, but they will complete all of the items on Part 1A of Form
ADV, not just the items required to be updated in a typical other-than-annual amendment).
108. FORM ADV, supra note 18, pt. 1A, at 5–6 (requiring exempt reporting advisers
to disclose only a limited subset of items on Form ADV).
109. Id.
110. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76
Fed. Reg. at 42,965–66 (requiring advisers to complete section 7.B.(1) of Schedule D for
any private fund that the adviser manages when, previously, Item 7 required advisers
only to complete section 7.B.(1) of Schedule D for “investment-related” limited
partnerships or limited liability companies that the adviser or a related person advised).
Part A of Section 7.B.(1) “requires an adviser to provide basic information regarding the
size and organizational, operational, and investment characteristics of each fund.” Id. at
42,965. Part B of the same section “requires advisors to report information concerning
five types of [private fund] service providers that generally perform important roles as
‘gatekeepers’”—which will both identify gatekeepers and give investors an idea of what
kinds of roles particular gatekeepers play. Id. at 42,968. For example, advisers must
indicate if a prime broker has custody of fund assets. Id. Information reported on this
section of Schedule D will be publicly available. Id. at 42,965.
111. FORM ADV, supra note 18, pt. 1A, at Item 5.C–D.
112. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76
Fed. Reg. at 42,955.
113. Id. (quoting Advisers Act § 203A(a)(3)).
114. Id. at 42,956.
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investment advisers less room to exercise discretion in counting or
excluding assets from RAUM.115
In order to provide the SEC with data, help it understand the
respective adviser’s business, and assist the SEC in preparing for on-site
examinations, revised Form ADV requires advisers to disclose their
clients, employees, compensation arrangements, and advisory activities.116
Required disclosures include the number of employees;117 the number of
employees who perform advisory functions, are registered representatives
of broker-dealers, are registered with state authorities as investment
adviser representatives, and are insurance agents; 118 and the number
of nonemployees—firms or other persons—who solicit advisory clients
on the adviser’s behalf.119
To help the SEC identify the entities and individuals with exposure to
hedge fund investments, advisers are required to identify their clients by
type including, for example, nonhigh and high net worth individuals,
investment companies, banks, charities, and insurance companies.120
Advisers must also identify what percentage of the adviser’s total
RAUM is owned by each particular type of client121 and what compensation
arrangements the adviser uses.122 Investment advisers are also required
to disclose the type of services they provide, including financial planning
services, portfolio management, pension consultation, security rating, or
educational seminars.123
115. Id.; see also id. at 42,955 (precluding advisers from excluding family assets,
proprietary assets, assets managed without compensation, and assets of foreign clients
when calculating RAUM). The Dodd-Frank Act gives the SEC authority to require
reporting and record keeping for assets carrying systemic risk. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub L.
No. 111-203, § 404, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010); Rules Implementing Amendments to
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed. Reg. at 42,955.
116. FORM ADV, supra note 18, pt. 1A, at Item 5; see Rules Implementing
Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed. Reg. at 42,970 (adopting
amendments to Item 5 largely as they were originally proposed, with only a few minor
changes).
117. FORM ADV, supra note 18, pt. 1A, at Item 5.A.
118. Id. at Item 5.B.
119. Id.; see also id. at Items 5.C, 5.H (specifically excluding as clients investors in
private funds that the adviser advises unless that investor also has a separate advisory
relationship with the adviser); id. at Item 5.C.(1)–(2) (asking for the number of clients
and what percentage are non-U.S. persons).
120. Id. at Item 5.D.(1).
121. Id. at Item 5.D.(2).
122. Id. at Item 5.E.
123. Id. at Item 5.G.; see also id. at Item 5.H (requiring disclosures pertaining to the
number of clients the adviser provided with financial planning services); id. at Item 5.I
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To avoid potential conflicts of interest between the different types of
businesses and services the adviser may engage in,124 Form ADV requires
advisers to identify their types of business activity,125 if one of those
businesses is primary to the adviser,126 and whether the adviser provides
any services other than investment advice to advisory clients.127 Because
conflicts of interest may arise in direct transactions between advisers or
related persons and clients, advisers are also required to disclose such
transactions.128 Other disclosures in this context include related-persons
status of brokers and dealers,129 soft dollar benefits, that is, research or
other products and services in connection with client transactions,130 and
compensation for client referrals.131
(asking whether the adviser participates in a wrap fee program); id. at Item 5.J (asking
whether the adviser previously indicated that it provides investment advice only with
respect to limited types of investments).
124. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76
Fed. Reg. 42,950, 42,970 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279).
125. FORM ADV, supra note 18, pt. 1A, at Item 6.A (providing that business
activities include broker-dealer, futures commission merchant, real estate broker, banking,
legal work, or accounting).
126. Id. at Item 6.B.(1)–(2).
127. Id. at Item 6.B.(3) (asking the adviser to describe other products and services).
128. Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76
Fed. Reg. at 42,971; FORM ADV, supra note 18, pt. 1A, at Item 8.A (requiring
disclosure as to whether the adviser or related person buys securities from or sells
securities to advisory clients, buys securities for himself that he also recommends to
advisory clients, or recommends securities to advisory clients in which the adviser or
related person has a proprietary ownership interest other than the two described
immediately above); id. at Item 8.B (requiring disclosure as to whether the adviser or
related person acts as a broker-dealer or a registered representative of a broker-dealer in
securities trades for brokerage customers in which advisory client securities are sold or
bought, recommends the purchase of securities for which the adviser or related person is
an underwriter, general or managing partner, or purchaser representative, or recommends
purchase or sale of securities to advisory clients for which the adviser or any related
person has any other sales interest); id. at Item 8.C (requiring disclosure as to whether
the adviser or related person has discretionary authority to determine what securities
should be sold on a client’s account or the amount of securities to be sold on that
account, to determine the broker or dealer to be used for purchases or sales for a client’s
account, or to determine the commission rates to be paid to a broker or dealer for a
client’s account).
129. Id. at Items 8.D, 8.F.
130. Id. at Item 8.G.
131. Id. at Items 8.H–I; see Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed. Reg. at 42,971–72 (adopting three amendments to Item 8:
(1) an adviser who indicates that he has discretionary authority to determine brokers or
dealers or that recommends brokers or dealers must report whether any of those brokers
or dealers are related persons; (2) advisers receiving soft dollar benefits must report
whether they are eligible for research or brokerage services under § 28(e) of the
Exchange Act’s safe harbor; and (3) an adviser must report whether it or its related
person receives direct or indirect compensation for client referrals); see also FORM ADV,
supra note 18, pt. 1A, at Items 8.C.3, 8.D–F, 8.G.(2); Commission Guidance Regarding
Client Commission Practices Under Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
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To assess investment advisers’ custodial practices, the SEC, in revised
Form ADV, requires disclosure as to whether the adviser or a related person
has custody of client assets,132 cash, bank accounts, or securities.133 The
adviser must indicate the total U.S. dollar amount held in custody and
the total number of clients’ cash, bank accounts, or securities subject to
adviser or related-person custody.134 If the adviser or a related person
has custody of client assets, revised Form ADV requires disclosure of
any irregularities to prevent fraud or mistakes.135 The adviser must also
indicate the number of persons, including the adviser and related persons,
acting as qualified custodians for clients in connection with advisory
services provided to those clients.136
2. Disclosure
In addition to making registration mandatory, the Dodd-Frank Act
requires registered hedge fund advisers to file periodic reports.137 The
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the SEC jointly
proposed new Form PF in January 2011.138 The SEC enacted Form PF
1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54165, 71 Fed. Reg. 41,978, 41,981–82 (July 24,
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2006/34-54165fr.pdf (providing
interpretive guidance in determining whether soft dollar benefits fit under the safe harbor
of § 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act).
132. FORM ADV, supra note 18, pt. 1A, at Item 9; see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
FORM ADV: GLOSSARY OF TERMS 2, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv.
pdf#glossary (“[An adviser has] custody if a related person holds, directly or indirectly,
client funds or securities, or has any authority to obtain possession of them, in
connection with advisory services [the adviser] provides to clients.”).
133. FORM ADV, supra note 18, pt. 1A, at Item 9.A–B.
134. Id.
135. Id. at Item 9.C (requiring advisers to disclose whether clients with assets under
custody receive statements, whether an independent public accountant audits client
accounts, or whether an independent public accountant prepares an internal control
report with respect to custodial services).
136. Id. at Item 9.D (asking whether the adviser or a related person acts as a
“qualified custodian” for clients in connection with advisory activities provided to clients
and requiring the adviser to identify any related person who acts as a qualified custodian
in § 7.A of Schedule D, regardless of whether the person is operationally independent
under rule 206(4)-2 of the Advisers Act).
137. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, § 404(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010);
17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1 (2012); Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds
and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF,
76 Fed. Reg. 71,128, 71,140 (Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 &
279), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-16/pdf/2011-28549.pdf.
138. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1 (requiring private fund advisers to file Form PF with
the SEC periodically); 17 C.F.R. § 4.27 (2012) (requiring private fund advisers to file
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in October 2011.139 The reporting requirement in Form PF is intended to
enable the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC),140 a council of
banking and securities regulators, to “facilitate [the] monitoring of systemic
risk in U.S. financial markets.”141 The SEC and the CFTC can utilize the
information collected on Form PF for investigations and examinations.142
In adopting the final rules, the SEC had to balance the FSOC’s interest
in quality information to monitor systemic risk with industry concerns.
Investment advisers are required to file Form PF if they hold $150
million RAUM or more attributable to private funds at the end of their
most recently completed fiscal year, they are registered or are required to
register with the SEC, and they advise a single private fund or several
Form PF if they are registered as commodity pool operators or commodity trading
advisers); Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity
Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,129.
139. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1; Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private
Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on
Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,239.
140. See Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain
Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg.
at 71,128–30 (establishing the FSOC to monitor and assess risks to the U.S. financial
system and to promote financial stability); see also Dodd-Frank Act § 112(d)(1)
(authorizing the FSOC to collect information to support its functions); Reporting by
Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and
Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,142 (“Form PF has been
designed to collect information to assist FSOC in monitoring and assessing systemic
risks that private funds may pose . . . .”).
141. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity
Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,129;
see also Dodd-Frank Act § 112 (“The purposes of the Council are—(A) to identify risks
to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial
distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies
or nonbank financial companies, or that could arise outside the financial services
marketplace; (B) to promote market discipline, by eliminating expectations on the part of
shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of such companies that the Government will
shield them from losses in the event of failure; and (C) to respond to emerging threats to
the stability of the United States financial system.”); EDWARD V. MURPHY & MICHAEL B.
B ERNIER , C ONG . R ESEARCH S ERV., F INANCIAL S TABILITY O VERSIGHT C OUNCIL:
A FRAMEWORK TO MITIGATE SYSTEMIC RISK (2011), available at http://www.llsdc.org/
attachments/wysiwyg/544/CRS-R42083.pdf (describing the mission, membership, and
scope of the FSOC and providing an analysis of FSOC-related policy issues Congress
may face); Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism
in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 627 (2012) (explaining the FSOC’s
charge to monitor and regulate systemic risk “throughout the entire U.S. financial sector”);
Jason Rudderman, Article, Eliminating Wall Street’s Safety Net: How a Systemic Risk
Premium Can Solve “Too Big To Fail,” 11 F LA . S T . U. B US . REV. 39, 46 (2012)
(describing the responsibilities tasked to the FSOC).
142. Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, and the
Hedge Fund Problem, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 27 (2011); Cheryl Nichols, Addressing Inept
SEC Enforcement Efforts: Lessons from Madoff, the Hedge Fund Industry, and Title IV
of the Dodd-Frank Act for U.S. and Global Financial Systems, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
637, 683 (2011).

270

[VOL. 50: 243, 2013]

Hedge Fund Manager Registration
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

private funds.143 The total number of investment advisers filing Form
PF will be relatively small but is likely to represent a substantial portion
of the assets of the industry. The SEC estimates that 230 U.S. hedge fund
advisers with at least $1.5 billion in RAUM attributable to hedge funds
at the end of any month in the prior fiscal quarter will file Form PF.144
The SEC expects this relatively small number of advisers to account for
80% of total hedge fund assets under management in the United States.145
Similarly, the approximately 155 investment advisers managing over $2
billion in private equity fund assets may represent roughly 75% of the
U.S. private equity fund industry.146
Form PF filing requirements depend partially on the size of the
investment adviser. The SEC takes a tiered approach intended to reflect
the relative risks of each type of fund.147 Hedge fund advisers with less
than $1.5 billion RAUM attributable to hedge funds are required to
complete and file Form PF on an annual basis.148 Large hedge fund
advisers, advisers with at least $1.5 billion RAUM attributable to hedge
funds,149 however, are required to update Form PF filings on a quarterly

143. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1; Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds
and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF,
76 Fed. Reg. at 71,132 (listing three criteria for filing Form PF that represent an initial
threshold for the minimal Form PF requirements). Most private fund advisers who meet
these three criteria will only be required to file Section 1 of Form PF. Id. Remaining
sections of Form PF will be filed by “large private fund advisers.” Id. at 71,132–33.
There are three types of large private fund advisers: (1) “[a]ny adviser having at least
$1.5 billion in [RAUM] attributable to hedge funds as of the end of any month in the
prior fiscal quarter;” (2) “[a]ny adviser managing a liquidity fund having at least $1
billion in combined [RAUM] attributable to liquidity funds and registered money market
funds as of the end of any month in the prior fiscal quarter;” and (3) “[a]ny adviser
having at least $2 billion in [RAUM] attributable to private equity funds as of the last
day of the adviser’s most recently completed fiscal year.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
144. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity
Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,135.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing PREQIN, PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY DATA PROVIDED BY PREQIN
(2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-05-11/s70511-69.pdf; PREQIN, PRIVATE
EQUITY INDUSTRY D ATA P ROVIDED BY PREQIN (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-05-11/s70511-1.pdf).
147. Id. at 71,136.
148. See id.; see also FORM PF, supra note 18, at Instruction 9 (providing different
filing periods for different types of advisers).
149. See Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain
Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 71,132–33 (defining “large private fund adviser”).
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basis.150 Mandatory quarterly reporting for large hedge fund advisers in
the United States aligns with international trends and is intended “to provide
the FSOC with timely data to identify emerging trends in systemic risk.”151
The disclosure requirements in Form PF pertain to several categories,
including information pertaining to the investment adviser, the funds
managed by the investment adviser, and information about individual
investors.152 Other categories that require disclosure under Form PF include
the products used by the investment adviser, performance and changes in
performance, financing information, risks metrics, strategies used, credit
exposure, and positions held by the investment adviser, among others.153
Form PF disclosure requirements pertaining to the hedge funds advised
by investment advisers require a breakdown of Net Asset Value (NAV)
managed by the adviser by hedge fund strategy154 and the percentage of
the reporting fund’s NAV managed by using computer-driven trading
algorithms.155 In the context of counterparty credit exposure, Form PF
requires hedge fund advisers to disclose the five trading counterparties to
which the reporting fund has the greatest net counterparty credit
exposure, 156 the name of the creditor, and the dollar amount owed to
each creditor.157 Other information required in this context includes
information about the collateral and other credit support counterparties
posted to the respective reporting funds158 and changes in market factors
and their effect on the long and short components of the portfolio as a
percentage of NAV.159
Form PF also requests information regarding the investment adviser’s
use of trading and clearing mechanisms.160 To enable the SEC to
understand the exposure of the advised hedge funds and their assets,
Form PF requires disclosure pertaining to the exposure of long and short
150. Id. at 71,140; FORM PF, supra note 18, at Instruction 9 (“[Y]ou [large hedge
fund advisers] must file a quarterly update that updates the answers to all Items in this
Form PF relating to the hedge funds that you advise.”).
151. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity
Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,130–
31, 71,140.
152. See 17 C.F.R. § 279.9 (2012) (establishing filing requirements for Form PF);
FORM PF, supra note 148, § 1a–b.
153. See FORM PF, supra note 18, passim.
154. Id. § 1a, Item B.3 (including the following private fund categories: (a) hedge
funds, (b) liquidity funds, (c) private equity funds, (d) real estate funds, (e) securitized
asset funds, (f) venture capital funds, (g) other private funds, (h) funds and accounts
other than private funds).
155. Id. § 1c, Item B.21.
156. Id. § 1c, Items B.22–23.
157. Id. § 2b, Item D.47.
158. Id. § 2b, Item B.36.
159. Id. § 2b, Item C.42.
160. Id. § 1c, Item B.24.
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positions161 and the value of turnover by asset class in the respective
reporting month.162 To help the SEC understand the liquidity of the
reporting fund’s portfolios, Form PF requires the investment adviser to
disclose the reporting fund’s positions and the time it would take to
liquidate them. 163 In addition, investment advisers have to disclose
information regarding the value of each of the advised funds’ borrowings
and the types of creditors164 and the aggregate value of all derivative
positions for each advised fund.165 Finally, Form PF requires disclosure
of information pertaining to investor liquidity—time period and percentage
of NAV locked166—and the reporting fund’s restrictions of investor
withdrawals and redemptions.167
III. METHODOLOGY
This empirical study analyzes the sampling of individual investment
advisers from a population of investment advisers registered in the United
States to make statistical inferences about the population using the sample.
The modes of data collection included e-mails with electronic surveys,
faxes with survey questionnaires, and phone interviews.168 Respondents
received no financial incentives. Nonfinancial incentives included the
Author’s promise to share the results of the survey study with respondents
upon completion.
The survey questions for this study were evaluated and tested through
more than twenty rounds of test runs with registered industry representatives
and academics working in the field. A large proportion of the survey
questions were open-ended questions. Open-ended questions were coded
into response clusters. Close-ended questions were only used to quantify
items. The response options for close-ended questions were exhaustive and
mutually exclusive. Close-ended questions were dichotomous and
continuous.
161. Id. § 2a, Item B.26; id. § 2b, Item B.30 (pertaining to investment advisers that
advise more than one hedge fund).
162. Id. § 2a, Item B.27.
163. Id. § 2b, Item B.32.
164. Id. § 2d, Item D.43.
165. Id. § 2b, Item D.45.
166. Id. § 2b, Item E.50.
167. Id. § 2b, Item E.49.
168. Mode effects are insignificant because each data collection method was based
on the same questionnaire and respondents were asked the same sequence of questions.
Furthermore, only a small portion of responses was obtained via phone interviews.
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The Author trained a team of research assistants throughout the test phase
on how to engage with respondents and how to code initial responses or
nonresponses. Interviewers recorded any responses, nonresponses, and
miscellaneous reactions in a coding sheet. The Author and several senior
assistants supervised the interviewers during the data collection and the
coder during the coding processes.169 Data files and coding were regularly
checked for accuracy and internal consistency.
A. Data Sources, Sampling, and Coding
To investigate the possible effects of hedge fund adviser registration
requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act, this study surveyed hedge fund
advisers in the United States that are subject to the registration requirement.
The SEC collects data pertaining to registered hedge fund advisers on its
Investment Adviser Registration Depository (IARD) website.170 The
Author obtained from the IARD website a dataset for the relevant
population, comprising 12,598 registered investment adviser firms.171
The Author applied several filters to ensure the sample is random, not
biased toward certain subgroups of hedge fund advisers, and representative
of the rest of the population of interest. The resulting dataset of 1264
firms includes investment adviser firms who (1) advise private funds,
(2) have contact information in the United States, (3) completed the
November 2011 version of Form ADV, and (4) have a status effective date
as of November 1, 2011. The Author had no control over the selection of
the sample. All respondents were approached using the same methodology
and volunteered their participation.
The filters were applied using several predefined parameters. The
Author filtered for affirmative responses to Item 7.B in Form ADV,
“Are you an adviser to any private fund?”172 This initial filter decreased
the dataset significantly, as 4054 firms responded in the affirmative and
327 firms did not answer the question, for a total of 4381 firms. To
ensure only U.S. hedge fund advisers were included in the population,
the Author removed investment adviser firms that had not reported a

169. Interviewers were physically located in separate rooms but next to the senior
assistant. Interviewers were able to get feedback and support as needed.
170. Historical Archive of Investment Adviser Reports, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/foia/iareports/inva-archive.htm (last modified May 1,
2013); see also Division of Investment Management: Electronic Filing for Investment
Advisers on IARD, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
investment/iard.shtml (last modified Aug. 6, 2012) (providing information on the IARD
and how to register or obtain information on investment advisers).
171. See Historical Archive of Investment Adviser Reports, supra note 170 (using
dataset dated May 1, 2012).
172. FORM ADV, supra note 18, pt. 1A, at Item 7.B.
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U.S. phone and fax number, including any firms that reported phone or
fax numbers with more than ten numbers. Thereafter, the Author filtered
for firms that had completed the revised version of Form ADV, dated
November 2011.173 These filters resulted in a subset of 3824 investment
advisers. Finally, the Author filtered the dataset for investment adviser
firms with the status effective dates as of November 1, 2011, resulting in
1264 firms. The Author added three investment advisers that volunteered
responses without direct solicitation by the Author after confirming that
these three investment advisers were listed in the SEC database, bringing
the total number of firms to 1267.
The survey instrument in the Appendix asks hedge fund advisers in
the United States to describe the possible effects of hedge fund manager
registration requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act relating to several
categories, including compliance measures, strategic responses, longterm effect of reporting and disclosure rules on private funds, long-term
effect of reporting and disclosure rules on the private fund industry, cost
of compliance, effect of the regulatory regime on AUM, and effect of the
regulatory regime on profitability.

173. See id. (inquiring about private funds and stating that advisers must complete
section 7.B.(1) of Schedule D for each private fund they advise, except when they “seek
to preserve the anonymity of a private fund client by maintaining its identity in [their]
books and records in numerical or alphabetical code, or similar designation, pursuant to
rule 204-2(d)”); see also Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 76 Fed Reg. 42,950, 42,992 n.634 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279) (describing Form ADV Item 7.B); Electronic Filing for Investment
Advisers on IARD: Forms, Policy, and Law, U.S. S EC . & E XCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iard/iastuff.shtml (last modified Sept. 12, 2012)
(providing current and historical ADV forms and relevant SEC releases).
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Methods of Receiving Surveys
U.S. Mail
1.06%
Survey
Monkey
E-mail
41.49%

Survey
Monkey
Web Link
3.19%

Phone
17.02%

E-mail
21.28%

Fax
15.96%

Figure 1.0, Methods of Receiving Surveys.

Figure 1.0 shows that the research team obtained sixteen responses
(17.02% of sample) via telephone interviews. The research assistants
completed the survey by hand when talking to firms on the phone. The
research team obtained fifteen responses (15.96% of sample) directly from
the investment adviser firms who completed the survey questionnaire by
hand and faxed it to the University of Saint Thomas School of Law.
A large proportion of the responses, thirty-nine responses (41.49% of
sample), was received via the e-mail link in Survey Monkey. The second
most common method of response was e-mail. The research assistants
gathered twenty responses (21.28% of sample) by advisers e-mailing an
electronic version of the survey to the research team. One survey was
received via U.S. mail, and three surveys were completed via a web link.
All completed questionnaires were scanned and saved electronically,
including backup copies. The research team matched most of the responses
to the Form ADV data collected by the SEC and maintained on the IARD
website. Of the ninety-four responses, seven (7.45% of the sample) could
not be linked to Form ADV data. The remaining eighty-seven responses
(92.55% of the sample) contained information that allowed the research
team to correspond the survey responses to the Form ADV information.
Affirmative responses in “Yes” and “No” categories were coded as “1.”
Survey questions two, three, four, five, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve allowed
respondents to provide open-ended answers. Firms’ responses to these
open-ended questions were copied into a separate worksheet, along with
a specifically assigned identification number for the survey response.
The identification number was used to facilitate coding of the clustered
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responses into the combined coding sheet. The answers could then be tied
to other Form ADV information and other survey questions.
For each open-ended question—survey questions two, three, four, five,
nine, ten, eleven, and twelve—the coder created a separate worksheet.174
The coder summarized the basic idea or ideas in each response to an
open-ended question in the top row of each worksheet and placed a check
mark in the column that corresponded to the adviser firm that provided the
response. The coder used a check mark for each subsequent response
that fit into existing clusters. If the response did not fit into an existing

174. Question 2 asked, “Which of the following actions have you taken to assure
compliance with Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting requirements?” Option “n.”
was “Other” and provided a blank for details. Twenty-four firms checked the “Other”
option, and one of those firms did not provide details. The other twenty-three firms
provided thirty-six discrete responses. There were thirteen different potential clusters,
but only five met the criteria for being a cluster—at least three responses. Question 3
asked, “Do you plan to implement strategic responses to the new registration and
disclosure requirements?” Question 3.b further probed, “If yes, what strategic responses
do you plan to implement?” Eighty-six firms answered Question 3 and twenty-four of
them responded “yes.” Three of those twenty-four firms did not provide an open-ended
response. From the twenty-one firms that said “yes” and provided a response, there were
thirty-five discrete answers that fell into twelve potential clusters. Six of the potential
clusters met the cluster criteria. Question 4 asked, “In what ways will the new registration
and disclosure rules affect your fund(s) in the next 5 years?” Eighty-two firms answered
the question. There were thirty-seven potential clusters based on 162 discrete responses.
Sixteen of those potential clusters met the cluster criteria. Question 5 asked, “In what
ways will the new registration and disclosure rules affect your industry in the next 5
years?” Seventy-eight firms answered the question. There were 140 discrete responses
and forty-three potential clusters. Only ten of the potential clusters met the criteria for a
cluster. Question 9 asked, “What affected your response to Item 8 [After the enactment
of Dodd-Frank Act reporting and disclosure requirements, what assets size (AUM)
would you desire to operate your fund(s)?]?” Sixty-two firms answered Question 9.
There were 109 responses that broke into thirty-five potential clusters. Eleven potential
clusters met the criteria. Question 10 asked, “Would you take the Form PF threshold for
quarterly reporting of $1.5 bil assets (AUM) into account in determining the appropriate
size of assets (AUM) for your fund(s)? . . . If yes, how would you take it into account?”
Eighty-seven firms answered the question, and seventeen of those firms said “yes.”
Eight of those seventeen firms did not provide any answer to the open-ended question.
The remaining nine provided twelve answers that did not fit into a cluster. Question 11
asked, “Have the new registration and disclosure requirements affected your fund’s
earnings / net rate of return to your investors? . . . If yes, how?” Ninety-two firms answered
the question, and only twenty-two said “yes.” Those twenty-two firms provided forty
discrete responses that fit into fourteen potential clusters. Six of those potential clusters
met the criteria for a cluster. Question 12 asked, “Have the new registration and
disclosure requirements affected the profits of your investment management company?
. . . If yes, how?” Ninety-two firms answered the question, and seventy-two said “yes.”
Those seventy-two firms provided 112 discrete answers, which fit into fourteen potential
clusters. Seven of those potential clusters met the criteria of a cluster.

277

cluster, the coder created a new cluster. Upon coding all of the responses
for one question, the coder counted the responses for each cluster. The
Author determined that at least three firms providing similar responses to a
question, either by using identical words or meaning, justifies the creation of
a cluster category. The coder adjusted cluster categories when coding had
been too narrow or too broad. For example, in Question 4, the initial cluster
was “increased procedures, reporting, and monitoring.” However, after
reviewing all responses, the coder determined that “increased
procedures,” “increased reporting,” and “increased monitoring” could be
included as separate cluster categories because some firms did not mention
all three. The coder reviewed the terminology used in noncluster responses
to determine if they could be included in an existing cluster. The Author
used responses by fewer than three firms in an established cluster for the
analysis of existing clusters but did not create a separate cluster for those
responses.
B. Sample Size and Sampling Constraints
Hedge fund managers have a tendency to disfavor any form of public
exposure for a variety of economic, performance, privacy-related, and
idiosyncratic reasons. Given the particular concern in the hedge fund
industry regarding confidentiality and privacy, obtaining a substantial
effective sample size for this study proved difficult. If hedge fund advisers
in the identified population did not respond, the Author and his team of
researchers approached each nonrespondent via fax and e-mail and
followed up with a phone call if there was no response. This procedure
proved successful and yielded ninety-four completed surveys, a response
rate of 7.42% of a population of 1267. This response rate is substantially
higher than the response rate of prior surveys in a related context.175
175. See, e.g., EISNERAMPER SURVEY, supra note 1, at 5 (seeking the opinions of
hedge fund managers on the Dodd-Frank Act, its impact on their organization, and the
future of the hedge fund industry, and obtaining forty-one responses through in-depth
phone interviews of twelve senior managers of hedge funds and asset management firms,
plus twenty-nine detailed e-mail surveys also completed by senior hedge fund
executives); ROTHSTEIN KASS, INDUSTRY OUTLOOK: HEDGE FUNDS 2.0: EVOLUTION IN
ACTION 4, 18 (2012), available at http://www.rkco.com/Corporate/Admin/Attachment
Files/proprietary_research/2012/RothsteinKass_HedgeFunds2.0F.pdf (surveying 400
hedge fund firms, of which “51.5 percent think that reporting set to be implemented in
the next 18 months, most notably Form PF, is a significant concern”); Tom Easton, Too
Big Not To Fail: Flaws in the Confused, Bloated Law Passed in the Aftermath of
America’s Financial Crisis Become Ever More Apparent, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21547784 (“[A]ccording to an informal survey of
hedge-fund managers, the cost of filling [the new Dodd-Frank form] out will be
$100,000–150,000 for each firm the first time it does it. After having done it once, those
costs might drop to $40,000 in every later year.”); Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Hedge Fund
Managers a Gloomier Lot in 2012-Survey, REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2012, 1:08 PM),
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The overwhelming majority of hedge fund advisers, 1173 (92.58% of
a population of 1267), did not respond. Some hedge fund managers cited
the advice of counsel as a reason not to participate in the survey. Other
hedge fund managers who declined to join the survey cited a general policy
not to partake in any surveys for privacy concerns, among other reasons.
The most common reason provided by interviewees for not participating
in the survey was that it went against company policy. Respondents
who participated in the study often repeatedly asked for confidentiality
pertaining to their survey responses or participated only on the condition
of confidentiality. The Author kept any details pertaining to the identity
of respondents or their firms strictly confidential. The researchers observed
a polarized distinction between large and small companies, as well as
those firms located in New York, or on the east coast, and those located
elsewhere. Most of the larger adviser firms and those located on the east
coast who did not participate cited company policy. Follow-up questions as
to the reasons for that company policy indicated that interviewees did
not want to divulge the company’s—or its clients’—financial status.
The Author and his team of researchers encountered a number of
problems during the process of collecting survey responses. The identity
and contact information for the chief compliance officer and chief legal
officer of the firms were not publicly available. Although Form ADV
requires advisers to disclose the contact information for their chief
compliance officer, the dataset provided by the SEC did not list this
information and did not include e-mail addresses. The filed copy of
Form ADV on the IARD website also did not contain chief compliance
officer information.176 The dataset obtained from the SEC did not include
the e-mail addresses, and neither did the individual Form ADVs on the
IARD website.
Because of the limited information available from the dataset, the Author
and his team of researchers faxed the survey to the entire population of

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/24/hedgefunds-survey-idUSL2E8FIL2Q20120424
(reviewing Rothstein Kass’s survey of 400 hedge fund managers in January 2012);
Hofstra Univ., supra note 1 (“A new report . . . [conducted] by the Frank G. Zarb School
of Business at Hofstra University in conjunction with accounting firm EisnerAmper LLP
. . . [interviewed m]ore than 40 senior managers from hedge funds and asset management
firms . . . .”).
176. The Author and his team of researchers inquired with the IARD about why the
information was not available. The IARD stated that information about the chief
compliance officer was mainly for the SEC and the Author could reach adviser firms via
the other contact information provided on Form ADV.
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1264 investment adviser firms on May 15, 2012. The team of research
assistants followed up via telephone with those firms that had not
previously responded. After two weeks, the time elapsed between the
fax and the follow-up phone call resulted in a lower response rate.
Increasingly, firms reached via phone requested the survey by e-mail.
Therefore, the Author and his team of research assistants obtained the
general inquiry e-mail address for each of the 1264 adviser firms via the
Internet. Each week, the research assistants e-mailed the link to the Survey
Monkey questionnaire to all firms with obtainable e-mail addresses,
including firms that had not completed the survey or had not responded
to the requests to participate. The procedure was repeated and modified
where necessary to attain the highest possible response rate.
C. Selection Bias
The literature has voiced doubts about the ability of surveys to reliably
yield representative samples for some time.177 Selection bias can occur
when researchers use a sample that is based on the nonrandom selection
of cases and draw inferences that are not statistically representative of
the population.178 The potential for sample selection bias exists when
researchers selected cases because they show and share the trait the
researcher hopes to explain179 and the researcher uses nonstatistical
selection procedures.180 It remains unclear, however, if increasing the
177. See Thomas W. Hall et al., The Effectiveness of Increasing Sample Size To Mitigate
the Influence of Population Characteristics in Haphazard Sampling, 20 AUDITING: J.
PRAC. & THEORY 169, 169 (2001).
178. Richard A. Berk, An Introduction to Sample Selection Bias in Sociological
Data, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 386, 391 (1983); David Collier, Translating Quantitative
Methods for Qualitative Researchers: The Case of Selection Bias, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
461, 462 (1995).
179. See Barbara Geddes, How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get:
Selection Bias in Comparative Politics, 2 POL. ANALYSIS 131, 140 (1990).
180. See PETER JONES, STATISTICAL SAMPLING AND RISK ANALYSIS IN AUDITING 11–
12 (1999); DONALD A. LESLIE ET AL., DOLLAR-UNIT SAMPLING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
AUDITORS 36–37 (1980); ARTHUR J. WILBURN, PRACTICAL STATISTICAL SAMPLING FOR
AUDITORS 4–6 (1984); Herbert Arkin, Statistical Sampling in Auditing, 27 N.Y.
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCT. 454, 457 (1957); W. Edwards Deming, On the Contributions of
Standards of Sampling to Legal Evidence and Accounting, 19 CURRENT BUS. STUD. 14,
18–21 (1954); Hall et al., supra note 177, at 170; Thomas W. Hall et al., The Use of and
Selection Biases Associated with Nonstatistical Sampling in Auditing, 12 BEHAV. RES.
ACCT. 231, 232–33 (2000); Clive S. Lennox et al., Selection Models in Accounting
Research, 87 ACCT. REV. 589, 611 (2012); Jennifer Wu Tucker, Selection Bias and
Econometric Remedies in Accounting and Finance Research, 29 J. ACCT. LITERATURE
31, 32 (2010); Neal B. Hitzig, Statistical Sampling Revisited, CPA J., May 2004, at 30,
available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/504/essentials/p30.htm; Tom Hall
et al., Haphazard Selection: Is It Time To Change Audit Standards? 1, 3–4 (Aug. 1, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1687443.
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sample size can increase representativeness and compensate for the
potential selection bias of nonstatistical techniques.181
Sample selection bias is mostly “a generic problem in social research . . .
when [researchers] do[] not observe a random sample of a population of
interest.”182 Many research traditions rely on designs that can be subject
to sample selection biases.183 In fact, exclusive reliance on observational
schemes that are free from selection bias could mean ignoring significant
findings with substantial policy implications.184 Moreover, selection results
naturally from human behavior,185 and the assumptions about how selection
occurs are important for selection bias models.186 Simulation studies
have shown that many of the techniques used to prevent selection bias
problems have mixed success rates, can worsen rather than improve
estimates, and may skew results under ordinary circumstances.187
The evaluation of the effects of hedge fund manager registration in
this Article rests on the subset of hedge fund managers who are subject

181. See DAN M. GUY ET AL., PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO AUDIT SAMPLING 160
(1998); JONES, supra note 180; RICHARD L. RATLIFF ET AL., INTERNAL AUDITING:
PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 628 (2d ed. 1996); Arkin, supra note 180, at 460; Deming,
supra note 180, at 23; Hall et al., supra note 177, at 170.
182. See Christopher Winship & Robert D. Mare, Models for Sample Selection
Bias, 18 ANN. REV. SOC. 327, 328 (1992).
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See generally Reuben Gronau, Wage Comparisons—A Selectivity Bias, 82 J.
POL. ECON. 1119 (1974); James J. Heckman & Guilherme Sedlacek, Heterogeneity,
Aggregation, and Market Wage Functions: An Empirical Model of Self-Selection in the
Labor Market, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1077 (1985); James J. Heckman & Guilherme L.
Sedlacek, Self-Selection and the Distribution of Hourly Wages, 8 J. LAB. ECON. S329
(1990); James J. Heckman & Bo Honoré, The Empirical Content of the Roy Model, 58
ECONOMETRICA 1121 (1990); H. Gregg Lewis, Comments on Selectivity Biases in Wage
Comparisons, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1145 (1974); A.D. Roy, Some Thoughts on the Distribution of
Earnings, 3 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 135 (1951); Robert J. Willis & Sherwin Rosen,
Education and Self-Selection, 87 J. POL. ECON. S7 (1979).
186. See Winship & Mare, supra note 182, at 328. See generally DRAWING INFERENCES
FROM SELF-SELECTED SAMPLES (Howard Wainer ed., 1986); NONPARAMETRIC AND
SEMIPARAMETRIC METHODS IN ECONOMETRICS AND STATISTICS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIFTH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS (William
A. Barnett et al. eds, 1991); Arthur S. Goldberger, Abnormal Selection Bias, in STUDIES
IN ECONOMETRICS, TIME SERIES, AND MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 67 (Samuel Karlin et al.
eds., 1983); Lung-Fei Lee, Some Approaches to the Correction of Selectivity Bias, 49
REV. ECON. STUD. 355 (1982); Abbas Arabmazar & Peter Schmidt, Note, An Investigation of
the Robustness of the Tobit Estimators to Non-Normality, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1055, 1055
(1982).
187. See Ross M. Stolzenberg & Daniel A. Relles, Tools for Intuition About Sample
Selection Bias and Its Correction, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 494, 494 (1997).
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to the SEC registration requirement. The Author chose a sample that is
expected to be representative of the population of hedge fund managers
who were exposed to the treatment—registration—without the use of
probabilistic randomizing aids. Randomizing the sample by including
respondents from outside of the hedge fund industry or respondents
other than hedge fund advisers would not have yielded representative
responses for the treatment group, hedge fund managers who had to
register, and population of interest, hedge fund advisers. Interviewing
the treatment group, hedge fund managers who had to register, and a
control group, hedge fund managers who did not have to register, would
not have yielded appropriate responses because the control group would
have had no exposure to the effect of the treatment, registration.
Identifying hedge fund managers who had been exposed to the treatment
and decided to avoid the treatment, by changing their organizational
structure, AUM, et cetera, proved practically and administratively very
difficult and would have resulted in a very small sample size for the
control group.
The sample size (n=94), 7.42% of the identified population of 1267
hedge fund advisers, represents the population of hedge fund managers
who were exposed to the treatment, registration, and responded to the
survey. Increasing the sample size for this study proved particularly
difficult because hedge fund managers have a tendency to shy away
from and disfavor any form of public exposure for a variety of economic
and idiosyncratic reasons. Even respondents who did agree to
participate in the survey study often repeatedly asked for confidentiality
pertaining to their survey responses or participated only on the condition
of confidentiality.
The Author had no control over the selection of the sample. All
respondents were approached using the same methodology and were
volunteer participants.188 Each member of the identified population of
hedge fund advisers had a known, nonzero chance of being selected as
part of the sample. The descriptive statistics demonstrate that the sample
is not biased and does not favor a particular subgroup of hedge fund
advisers.189 There is no indication that respondents who did respond to
the survey were different from individuals who did not respond.

188. Obtaining information through voluntary responses can create an inherent bias
because people with a special interest may be more likely to respond. However, the
descriptive statistics demonstrate that the sample is representative of the population, at least
under the examined parameters.
189. See infra Part IV.
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IV. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Figures 2.0 to 2.8 demonstrate that the sample of hedge fund advisers
(n=94) in this study is representative of the population of 1267 investment
adviser firms.190

Form of Organization
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%

GI Population

40.00%
30.00%

■ Sample

20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Corporation

LLC

LP

Partnership

Figure 2.0, Comparison Form of Organization.

Figure 2.0 compares the form of organization in the population of
1267 identified advisers with the sample of hedge fund advisers that
completed the survey. The form of organization is reported on Form ADV,
Part 1A, Item 3.A.191 In the sample, 67.82% of the advisers used a limited
liability company (LLC) compared to 65.51% of the population. In
addition, 8.05% of advisers in the sample utilized the corporate form in
comparison with 12.79% of advisers in the population. The advisers in
the sample used a limited partnership (LP) in 21.84% of the cases, and
the population used an LP in 19.26% of the cases. Given these small
variances, the sample is representative of the population because the sample
closely mirrors the percentages and relative values of the population in
terms of the form of organization used.

190. The sample of hedge fund advisers in Figures 2.0 to 2.8 is n=87 because the
research team matched the advisers’ responses to Form ADV data.
191. FORM ADV, supra note 18, pt. 1A, at Item 3.A.
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Number of Clients Provided Investment
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Figure 2.1, Comparison of the Number of Clients Who Received Investment
Advisory Services During the Past Fiscal Year.

Figure 2.1 compares the number of clients to whom advisers provided
investment advisory services in the most recent fiscal year in the
population of the 1267 identified advisers with the sample of investment
advisers who completed surveys. The number of clients is reported on
Form ADV, Part 1A, Item 5.C.192 In the sample, 81.61% of the advisers
had between one and ten clients compared to 82.08% of the population.
In the sample, 13.79% of advisers had eleven to twenty-five clients, and
in the population, 12.08% of advisers had eleven to twenty-five clients.
Of the advisers in the sample, 1.15% had twenty-six to one hundred
clients, whereas 2.68% of the advisers in the population serviced twentysix to one hundred clients. Form ADV does provide a “0” option for
advisers who did not provide investment advisory services to any clients
in the most recently completed fiscal year. Overall, the sample is
representative of the population because the sample closely mirrors the
percentages and relative values of the population in terms of the number
of clients provided with investment advisory services.

192.
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Id. at Item 5.C.
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Type of Adviser
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Figure 2.2, Comparison of the Type of Adviser.

Figure 2.2 compares the type of advisers in the population of the 1267
identified advisers with the sample of investment advisers who completed
surveys. The type of adviser is reported on Form ADV, Part 1A, Item
2.A.193 In the sample, 94.25% of the advisers were a large advisory firm
compared to 93.45% of the advisers in the population. The SEC defines
large advisory firms as either having RAUM of $100 million or RAUM
of $90 million at the time of the firm’s most recent annual updating
amendment registered with the SEC.194 In the sample, 3.45% of advisers
were midsized and 3.31% of the advisers in the population were midsized.
Overall, the sample is representative of the population because the
sample closely mirrors the percentages and relative values of the
population in terms of the type of adviser, as defined by the SEC on
Form ADV.

193.
194.

Id. at Item 2.A.
See id.
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Figure 2.3, Comparison of the SEC Region.

Figure 2.3 compares the SEC Region of the population of the 1267
identified advisers with the sample of investment advisers who completed
surveys. The SEC Region is determined by the geographic location of
the principal office of the adviser. In the sample, 35.63% of the advisers
were from NYRO (New York region) compared to 44.67% of the
population. In the sample, 17.24% of advisers were located in BRO
(Boston region), whereas 14.84% of the population was in the Boston
region. CHRO (Chicago region) accounted for 17.24% of the sample
and 8.60% of the population. Advisers in the New York region were
less responsive to the survey than those in the Boston and Chicago regions.
Overall, the sample adequately represents the geographical variance seen
in the population as respondents voluntarily engaged in the survey, and
they were selected randomly.
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Figure 2.4, Comparison of the AUM of Firms.

Figure 2.4 compares the AUM of the population of the 1267 identified
advisers with the sample of investment advisers who completed surveys.
Advisers provided AUM data on Form ADV, Part 1A, Item 5.F.(2).195
The form does not provide predetermined ranges for AUMs.196 The
advisers simply provide a number.197 For this analysis, the Author chose
AUM ranges for the above graph. The sample contains more advisers
with $2 billion to $10 billion (17.24%) compared to the population
(15.79%). Further, the sample includes more advisers with $0.5 billion
to $1 billion in AUM (22.99%) versus the population (16.97%). On the
other hand, the sample slightly underrepresents the population in the
following areas: less than $150 million AUM (sample 10.34%, population
11.84%), $150 million to $500 million AUM (sample 35.63%, population
37.73%), and $1.0 billion to $1.5 billion AUM (sample 4.60%, population
9.23%). Overall, the sample adequately represents the diversity of the
AUM seen in the population.

195.
196.
197.

Id. at Item 5.F.(2).
See id.
See id.

287

Advisory Services
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%

Population
Sample

0%

Figure 2.5, Comparison of the Advisory Services.

Figure 2.5 compares the type of advisory services provided by the
population of the 1267 identified advisers with the sample of investment
advisers who completed surveys. Advisers disclosed the types of advisory
services on Form ADV, Part 1A, Item 5.G.198 In the sample, 98.85% of
the advisers provided portfolio management for pooled investment vehicles
versus 96.53% of the population. In the sample, 13.79% had portfolio
management for businesses or institutional clients compared to 13.65%
in the population. Advisers providing portfolio management services for
individuals accounted for only 1.15% of the sample and 5.84% of the
population. Several other categories of services did not warrant discussion
and were excluded from the graph. Overall, the sample is representative
of the population in terms of advisory services offered by advisers.

198.
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Figure 2.6, Response Summary for Each Survey Question.

Figure 2.6 shows the number of responses to each question in the
survey instrument. Overall, participants completed the entire survey.
The three questions with the fewest responses were open-ended questions.
Question 6.a.ii asked, “Compliance with all federal rules and procedures
(Treasury, SEC, CFTC etc.) will take approximately: ____ hours per year.”
Question 6.b.ii inquired, “Compliance with all federal rules and procedures
(Treasury, SEC, CFTC etc.) will annually cost approximately: _____.”
Question 9 stated, “What affected your response to Item 8 [After the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank reporting and disclosure requirements,
what assets size (AUM) would you desire to operate your fund(s):]?”
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Figure 2.7, Number of Advisers Advising Each Type of Private Fund.

Figure 2.7 shows how many advisers in the sample advised each type
of private fund. Advisers disclosed what types of private funds they advise
on Form ADV, Part 1A, Schedule D, section 7.B.(1).199 Advisers complete
that section for each fund they advise. In the sample, thirty-three advisers
reported having at least one hedge fund. Additionally, forty-one advisers
had at least one private equity fund. The sample included nine advisers
with at least one real estate fund and two firms with at least one venture
capital fund.

199.

290

Id. at Item 7.B; id. at Schedule D, § 7.B.(1).
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Figure 2.8, Number of Private Funds in the Sample.

Figure 2.8 shows the number of private funds in the sample. The advisers
in the sample managed 88 hedge funds, 243 private equity funds, 27 real
estate funds, 15 venture capital funds, and 42 other funds.
V. RESULTS
The findings of this survey study are intended to support policymakers
who are implementing new rules pertaining to the hedge fund industry.
This is the first observational study conducted after the registration
effective date with a population of registered private fund advisers who
are based in the United States. The study quantifies compliance costs; it
assesses compliance measures and the hedge fund industry’s strategic
responses to the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act; and it investigates
the possible long-term effects of hedge fund registration and the
implications of the disclosure requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act
pertaining to hedge funds. The study also evaluates the long-term effects of
reporting and disclosure rules on private funds and the private fund
industry, the effect of the regulatory regime on AUM, and the effect of the
regulatory regime on profitability. The findings of this survey study
can be categorized into: (1) Common Actions, (2) Strategic Responses,
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(3) Compliance Cost, (4) AUM, (5) Fund Earnings, and (6) Investment
Management Company.
A. Common Actions

Most Common Actions Taken
70

■

llired addit ional counsel

r.;;i New record-keeping policies

!ID Hired addi tional staff
~

Changed marketing materials

[a Cbanged communication with investors
[J Olher

Figure 3.0, Common Actions Taken in Response to Dodd-Frank.

Figure 3.0 shows that a majority of respondents have instituted measures
to respond to the new registration and disclosure requirements. The most
common actions taken include: (1) outsourced compliance work, (2) hired
additional counsel, (3) instituted new record-keeping policies, (4) hired
additional staff, (5) changed marketing materials, and (6) changed
communications with investors.
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Least Common Actions Taken
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Figure 3.1, Least Common Actions Taken in Response to Dodd-Frank.

Figure 3.1 shows the least common actions taken to respond to
the registration and reporting requirements. Hedge fund advisers in the
sample did not terminate existing employment relationships. A minority
of respondents: (1) severed an advising relationship, (2) changed funds’
(legal) structure, (3) liquidated positions, (4) changed investment styles,
(5) changed portfolio structure, or (6) closed funds to new investors.
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Figure 3.2, Breakdown of Actions Taken in Response to Dodd-Frank.

Figure 3.2 shows the difference in the percentage of advisers who
planned specific actions, based on how they answered the question: “Do
you plan to implement strategic responses to the new registration and
disclosure requirements?” For the sample of ninety-four advisers, the
advisers who planned a strategic response (twenty-four advisers) were
much more likely to: outsource compliance work (Question 2.b), change
marketing materials (Question 2.g), and change communications with
investors (Question 2.h). Those same advisers were slightly less likely
to institute new record-keeping policies (Question 2.c) and hire new staff
(Question 2.d) compared with advisers who did not plan a strategic
response (sixty-two advisers) to Dodd-Frank.
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B. Strategic Responses

Plan a Strategic Response to
Dodd-Frank
Yes
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No
72.09%

Figure 4.0, Advisers Who Plan a Strategic Response to Dodd-Frank.

Figure 4.0 indicates that a majority (72.09%) of survey respondents do
not plan a strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act registration and
reporting requirements. Some responses to survey Question 3 could
perhaps be interpreted as inconsistent with responses to survey Question
2 because some respondents may consider their actions in response to
survey Question 2 as strategic, others may not.
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C. Compliance Cost
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Figure 4.1, Hours Required To Comply with Dodd-Frank.

Figure 4.1 suggests that although a majority of advisers spend less than
500 hours to comply with the new registration and reporting requirements,
some funds advisers estimate it will take them between 500 and 1000
hours to comply with the requirements. Some believe more than 1000
hours will be required to comply.
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Figure 4.2, Annual Hours Required To Comply with All Federal Rules.

Figure 4.2 suggests that the hours needed to comply with all federal
rules and regulations pertaining to hedge fund advisers range from 50 up
to 4000 hours per year, with a majority of responses estimating the time
requirement will be 750 hours or less per year. The median response
was 500 hours per year. Seventy-five percent of respondents believed
the federal rules would take 750 hours or less each year. On the other
hand, 25% indicated the federal rules would require more than 750
hours.
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Cost Required To Comply with Dodd-Frank
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Figure 4.3, Cost of Compliance with Dodd-Frank Reporting Requirements.

Figure 4.3 illustrates the actual cost of compliance with the registration
and disclosure requirements. A majority of respondents found the
compliance cost will range from $50,000 to $200,000. However, a
significant minority estimates the total compliance cost will range from
$200,000 to over $400,000.
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Compliance Hours vs. Compliance Cost
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Figure 4.4, Compliance Hours vs. Compliance Cost.

Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between compliance cost and the
hours required to fulfill the compliance requirements for the registration
and disclosure rules. Each point plots a single respondent’s answers for
hours and costs. Figure 4.4 shows a fitted upward sloping line. Robust and
weighted regression analysis with several independent variables could
change the analysis and interpretation of the data in this study but is beyond
the scope of this Article.200

200. See Wulf A. Kaal, Do Compliance Costs of Financial Regulation Affect Smaller
Firms More than Larger Firms? Evidence from the Private Fund Industry 27 (June 18,
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (showing that the size of hedge
fund managers as measured by AUM is associated with compliance costs and other
independent variables).
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Figure 4.5, Annual Cost of Complying with All Federal Rules.

Figure 4.5 shows a histogram of the median cost for complying with
all the federal rules. This question was open-ended, and some respondents
provided ranges—for example, 250–500 hours. The Author took the
mean number of the range in order to graphically show the results.
Consequently, the response “250–500 hours” became “375 hours.” The
graph shows that a considerable number of respondents believe it will
cost $100,000 or less to comply with all the rules. A second significant
cluster believes the annual cost will be between $225,000 and $400,000.
A small group put the cost of compliance at greater than $500,000 a
year.
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D. Assets Under Management

Consider Current Regulations To Determine
AUM Size
Yes
17.98%

No
82.02%

Figure 5.0, Percentage of Advisers Considering the Regulatory Regime in the
AUM Decision.

Figure 5.0 illustrates the responses to Survey Questions 7.a and 7.b:
“Would you take the current regulatory regime into account in
determining the appropriate size of asset[s] (AUM) for your fund(s)?”
Of those who responded, 82.02% would not have taken the current
regulatory regime into account in determining the AUM size of their
funds.
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How Advisers Will Take Regulatory Regime
into Account in AUM Decision
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25.00%

■ Following

Form ADV

31.25%
Figure 5.1, How Advisers Account for the Regulatory Regime in the AUM Decision.

Figure 5.1 shows the majority of clustered responses pertaining to
Survey Question 7.b.i: “Would you take the current regulatory regime
into account in determining the appropriate size of asset[s] (AUM) for
your fund(s)? . . . If Yes—How would you take it into account?”
A majority of respondents stated that as a result of the current regulatory
regime their AUM would need to change. A significant number (25%)
would go smaller to avoid the regulatory hassle. A larger percentage
(50%) expressed either increasing current AUM size to cover expenses
or mentioned the need for a certain size in order to account for the
increase in expenses. One response stated that “under $1.5 billion is
ideal.” On the other hand, one respondent explained, “Our goal is to grow
our business and attract additional investors, regardless of regulatory
requirements.”
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Taking the Regulatory Regime into Account
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Figure 5.2, When Advisers Considered the Regulatory Regime in the AUM
Decision.

Figure 5.2 shows that the majority of respondents placed a greater
emphasis on the importance of the regulatory regime in determining the
size of AUM for managed funds after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act.
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Figure 5.3, Desired AUM After Dodd-Frank.

Figure 5.3 indicates that a majority of respondents prefer an AUM size
of between $150 million and $1.5 billion. Although a significant portion
of respondents (21.84%) did not indicate a desired AUM size after the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, a substantial portion of respondents
prefer between $500 million and $2 billion in AUM. Of the respondents,
28.74% desire an AUM size between $150 million and $500 million,
16.09% desire an AUM size between $500 million and $1 billion, and
13.79% of respondents prefer an AUM size of more than $2 billion.
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Factors Influencing AUM Preference
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Figure 5.4, Factors Influencing AUM Preference.

Figure 5.4 illustrates the array of responses pertaining to Survey
Question 9: “What affected your response to Item 8 [desired AUM size
after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act]?” The Author and his team
of researchers clustered the responses into several categories. A majority of
respondents did not want to change the size of their AUM. The majority
of respondents did not consider Dodd-Frank Act regulations if they
changed the AUM size of their funds. Others expressed a desire to maintain
their existing AUM size. Several respondents with a smaller AUM size
stated they wanted to maintain their existing AUM size. Some respondents
indicated that their responses were affected by their increased expenses
as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act requirements.
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Consider $1.5 Billion Form PF
Requirements for AUM
Yes
19.54%

No
80.46%

Figure 5.5, Advisers Who Consider the $1.5 Billion Form PF Threshold in the AUM
Decision.

Figure 5.5 presents the responses pertaining to Survey Question 10:
“Would you take the Form PF threshold for quarterly reporting of $1.5
bil assets (AUM) into account in determining the appropriate size of
assets (AUM) for your fund(s)?” Of those who responded, 80.46%
would not take the Form PF threshold for quarterly reporting of $1.5
billion AUM into account in determining the appropriate size of AUM
for the fund(s) they manage, whereas 19.54% would take it into account.
A majority of those respondents who would take it into account plan to
stay under the Form PF threshold for quarterly reporting of $1.5 billion
AUM. Other respondents indicated that the Form PF threshold was not
relevant. Some respondents stated they may close the fund to new investors
to stay under the Form PF threshold requirement. Others indicated that
they were only subject to part of the Form PF requirement but would
still take into account Form PF. Another common theme in responses
was the ability to allocate the resources needed to complete Form PF
before increasing the AUM.
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E. Fund Earnings

Dodd-Frank Affected Fund’s Earnings?
Yes
23.91%

No
76.09%

Figure 6.0, Whether Dodd-Frank Affected Fund’s Earnings.

Figure 6.0 shows the responses to Survey Questions 11a and 11b:
“Have the new registration and disclosure requirements affected your
fund’s earnings/net rate of return to your investors?” Of those who
responded, 76.09% stated that their investors’ rate of return has not been
affected by the registration and disclosure requirements, whereas 23.91% of
respondents believe their investors will be affected by the registration
and disclosure requirements.
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How Has Dodd-Frank Affected Fund’s
Returns
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Figure 6.1, How Dodd-Frank Affected Fund’s Returns.

Figure 6.1 shows the concerns of the 23.91% of respondents who
stated that their investors’ rate of return would be affected by the
registration and disclosure requirements. The majority of the respondents
indicated that the increased expenses caused by the registration and
disclosure requirements were the most likely to affect their fund’s returns.
Other responses worth mentioning include the burden of costs on the
management company and undeterminable opportunity costs because of
distraction from core fund management. Several respondents stated it is
too early to tell if additional burdens stemming from the Dodd-Frank
Act will slow down activity and reduce investor returns. Others were
concerned by the threat of reduced liquidity because large banks would
not be able to participate any longer. Some mentioned the loss of all outside
members of the investment committee, the resulting access to fewer
deals, the loss of competitive differentiation, and higher cost of capital in
the future. Several respondents were unsure what expenses could be
passed to the investors.
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F. Investment Management Company

Dodd-Frank Affected Management Company
Profits?
No
21.74%

Yes
78.26%

Figure 7.0, Whether Dodd-Frank Affected Management Company Profits.

Figure 7.0 shows the responses to Survey Question 12: “Have the new
registration and disclosure requirements affected the profits of your
investment management company?” Of those who responded, 78.26%
indicated that the profits of their investment management company were
affected. In the pool of respondents for this study, the responses seem to
indicate that it is the management company that bears the brunt of costs
associated with the registration and disclosure requirements. It is
unclear whether and how the increased expenses will be passed on to
investors over time.
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Figure 7.1, How Dodd-Frank Affected Management Company Profits.

Figure 7.1 breaks down the individual responses of the 78.26% of
respondents who indicated that the profits of their investment management
company were affected. Of those who responded, 87.50% indicated that
the profits of their investment company were affected by increased costs
and decreased profits as a result of the registration and reporting
requirements. Other responses included references to the cost of outside
consultants, registration costs, the cost to upgrade IT, general opportunity
costs, and the cost to small firms who cannot as easily absorb these costs.
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Dodd-Frank Effect on Fund(s)
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Figure 7.2, How Dodd-Frank Will Affect Fund(s) in the Next Five Years.
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Figure 7.2 shows the different response categories to Survey Question
4: “In what ways will the new registration and disclosure rules affect
your fund(s) in the next 5 years?” Of those who responded, 46.34%
indicated that the Dodd-Frank registration and disclosure rules create
higher costs that affect their funds. Only 2.44% of respondents indicated
that they would have to change their strategy significantly as a result of
the registration and disclosure requirements, but 4.88% reported that the
new requirements would not result in a strategy change. According to
15.85% of the respondents, the registration and disclosure requirements
increased their administrative burden, while 20.73% reported that the
registration and disclosure requirements had no effect on their funds.
Other cluster categories with comparatively high response rates include
responses pertaining to the diversion of staff time from investing, increased
administrative burdens, an increase in required procedures, increased
reporting, and additional work for existing staff.
Many comments from respondents that did not justify a cluster category
also proved very insightful. One respondent indicated that growing the
fund to cover increased overhead at the management company would
mean that the management company would need to engage in larger
transactions. This would likely lead to staff changes and the need to hire
a team that can do larger deals. Another respondent merged its fund
with another fund to increase efficiency. Other respondents were concerned
about the additional time it would take to raise funds, the prevention of
expansion, the general time drain, and being increasingly on the SEC’s
radar after registration. Some respondents indicated that they are closing
multifamily offices to return to a single-family office. Some respondents
stated that the registration and disclosure rules require additional
communication with investors. Investment advisers whose primary
business was not in investing in securities but who held a small pool of
securities as part of their business indicated that the registration
requirements may result in the divestiture of their securities.
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Figure 7.3, How Dodd-Frank Will Affect the Industry in the Next Five Years.
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Figure 7.3 illustrates the cluster of responses to Survey Question 5:
“In what ways will the new registration and disclosure rules affect your
industry in the next 5 years?” Similar to their responses to Survey Question
4, respondents referred mostly to the additional costs resulting from the
registration and disclosure rules. According to 43.59% of respondents,
the private fund industry is affected by the cost of the registration and
disclosure rules under the Dodd-Frank Act. Of those who responded,
23.08% reported that increased administrative burdens constitute an
important factor that affects the private fund industry. Another response
cluster that merits mentioning is the creation of barriers to entry for other
funds because of a less attractive market environment for private funds as
a result of the registration and disclosure requirements. Several respondents
mentioned the limited viability of small funds and the consolidation of
the industry.
Several comments from individual respondents that did not justify a
cluster category proved very insightful. One respondent indicated that
fundraising would have to be prolonged because of the expanded due
diligence from institutional investors that resulted from the changes in
the regulatory environment pertaining to the private fund industry.
Others believe that some managers will be forced out of the market
because of the increased costs of compliance. Another raised concerns
over lower middle market fundraising activity that could lead to a
lowering of the deal activity. Some respondents welcomed the regulatory
changes because it would make funds easier to compare. Some felt that
the SEC is giving investors a false sense of comfort that the SEC is
taking care of investors’ money. Other responses included a concern
that the industry may become more competitive and less profitable and
that the new regulatory environment would make it tougher to market
new funds.
One comment seems worthy quoting here as it explains a significant
change for the industry as it pertains to the ability of startup funds to
overcome barriers to entry into the market for hedge fund advisers. The
respective hedge fund adviser stipulated as follows: “It used to take 25–
50 mil. to start a hedge fund in NY and then buil[d] a record and grow.
Today it is at least 100 mil. [b]ecause of the increased cost of compliance
with the registration and disclosure requirements.”
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Studies conducted before the hedge fund manager registration effective
date, March 30, 2012, indicate that hedge fund managers expected Dodd-
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Frank Act rules and regulations pertaining to the hedge fund industry to
harm U.S. competitiveness.201 A small group of managers believed the
FSOC would be able to address systemic risk in the financial system.202
Most hedge fund managers expected their operational costs to be affected
by increased compliance costs because of Dodd-Frank regulations.203
These prior studies left many questions unanswered because they were
conducted before the registration effective date and had substantially
lower sample sizes.204
A. Summary of Key Findings
The results reported in this study suggest that the Dodd-Frank Act
registration and disclosure requirements and the SEC’s implementation
of these rules create several areas of concern for the hedge fund industry.
Of those who responded, 46.34% indicated that the Dodd-Frank
registration and disclosure rules create higher costs that affect the funds
they manage, while 78.26% of respondents stated that the profits of their
investment management company were affected. According to 87.50%
of the respondents, the profits of their investment companies were affected
by increased costs and decreased profits as a result of the registration and
reporting requirements. A majority of respondents have (1) outsourced
compliance work, (2) hired additional counsel, (3) instituted new recordkeeping policies, (4) hired additional staff, (5) changed marketing materials,
and (6) changed communications with investors. A minority of respondents
changed their funds’ legal structures in response to the registration and
disclosure requirements.
Despite these concerns, the hedge fund industry appears to be only
modestly affected by the Dodd-Frank reporting and disclosure requirements
and is adapting well to the new regulatory environment. The results
show that 82.02% of respondents do not take the current regulatory
regime into account in determining the AUM size of their funds. The
percentage drops to 72.09% of survey respondents who do not plan a
strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act registration and reporting
201. Hofstra Univ., supra note 1; see also ROTHSTEIN KASS, supra note 175, at 18
(reporting that 51.5% of hedge fund managers polled think that reporting, particularly
Form PF, is a “significant concern”).
202. See Hofstra Univ., supra note 1.
203. Id.
204. Compare ROTHSTEIN KASS, supra note 175 (consulting 400 hedge fund firms),
with EISNERAMPER SURVEY, supra note 1 (interviewing forty-one managers).

315

requirements. Firms that planned a strategic response were smaller than
those firms that did not plan a strategic response. Of those who responded,
76.09% stated that their investors’ rate of return was not affected by the
registration and disclosure requirements.
A majority of advisers quantified the cost of compliance in a range
from $50,000 to $200,000. However, a significant minority estimated
that the total compliance cost would range between $200,000 to over
$400,000. Although a majority of advisers spent less than 500 hours to
comply with the new registration and reporting requirements, many fund
advisers estimate it will take them between 500 and 1000 hours to comply
with the requirements. The hours needed to comply with all federal
rules and regulations pertaining to hedge fund advisers range from under
100 up to 4000 hours, with a majority of responses ranging from over
300 hours to 800 hours.
A majority of respondents did not feel the need to change the size of
their AUM, and Dodd-Frank Act regulations were not factors a majority
of respondents considered if they did change the AUM size of their
funds. For 80.46% of respondents, the Form PF threshold for quarterly
reporting of $1.5 billion AUM is not taken into account in determining
the appropriate size of AUM for the funds they manage. A majority of
the 19.54% of respondents who would take the Form PF threshold into
account plan to stay under the Form PF threshold for quarterly reporting
of $1.5 billion AUM.
B. Private Fund Policy and Future Research
The results reported in this study have implications for private fund
policy. The private fund industry seems to be adjusting well, and the
impact of the registration and disclosure rules appears to be much less
intense than the industry initially anticipated. Although hedge fund
advisers may absorb the reported cost implications of registration and
disclosure rules relatively quickly after registration, the long-term cost
implications of registration and reporting obligations could affect the
private fund industry.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the information disclosed by hedge
fund advisers in the required Forms ADV and PF can be presented in
ways that in effect “flatten out” and “sanitize” the disclosures. Although
the level of sanitizing of disclosures cannot be verified, sanitized
disclosures could be less useful for FSCO and SEC evaluation and their
determination of the systemic risk posed by private funds.
Although this study shows trends and perceptions within the industry,
it does not provide insights on the long-term implications of the
registration and disclosure requirements because the data was collected
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within a relatively short time period after the registration requirements
took effect. The data for this study was collected within three months of
the SEC’s registration effective date, March 30, 2012. Future studies are
needed to determine if the long-term impact of the Dodd-Frank Act is as
moderate as this study suggests.
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VII. APPENDIX: SURVEY INSTRUMENT

- PRIVAT E FUND REGISTRATION & DISCLOSURE

To: Cb.ief Leg•I I Complfonce Officer
To Whom It May Concl'rn

From: Unfrersity or t. T lmm:as

SehoolofU,
J)rofessor Wulf K:ii1l
1000 LaSalle /\vc. , ~ISU00
).linncnpolis. l\lN S.S-103
Tclcpl,ooc: 1 (6S1 )962-4972
Cell: 1 (312) 810-4390
Focsimilc: 1 (6Sl) 962-1881

"111 lkaal a lthonms.edu
hllp:l"'""'·s!thomas.cdu/Jaw/f
•cullys1all)fo ull y/kaalwulrl
May 14. 2012

Dear Sir or Madame:
In lhc lasl lwo de-codes, lhc S Chas rcpcaicdl y altcmplcd 10 rcgi,icr privalc funds. llic
Dodd-Frank Acl now authorizes ihe SEC to bring pri vale funds under regulalory supervision.
The purpose of lhis survey is for researchers al lhe University of St. Thomas School of Law in
M inneapolis to learn more about your experiences \\~lh recent privalc fund regi stration and
disclosure. requirements under 1hc Dodd-Frank Acr.

To reduce any risks in your participalion. we will oot identify you or your finn by name
in any way. We would be happy 10 share the results of 1his survey with you. as they may prove
to be infonnative in the administrative management of yo ur fwld(s). If deemed desirable aild
only with your conscn1~we \\'Ould nlso be happy lo share the results of1his surve \\~lh your
investors.

We \\i ll follow up with a shori phone call. Alicrna1ively, we would be happy 10 receive
you r responses via email o[rl fax. We very nn,:h apprecialc your suppon.
Please feel free to contact us at rour co1wcnicncc ,,~1h an questions.
Yours incerel .

Prof. Wulf Kaai
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QUESTIONS

I. I your i,westment ad11w I fm1d Jl\anagc>r registered with the SEC
a. Yl!sO
b. No D

2. Which of the following actions have you taken to asstrre compliance with Dodd-Frank

Act regi tration and reporting requirements?
Please check all that appl)'

a. Outsourced compliance 11·oik 0
b. Hired additional counsel D
c, Instituted new n.'OOrd-kecping policies D
d. Hired additional staffO
c. Fired stnff O
f. Sel'crcd an ndl'ising relationship with clicnt(s) (i.e. closed fund and went pri ate
to escape registration and di closure requirem,nts)O
g, Changed marketing materials 0
h. ChangOO eommunicntio1u wilh inv1.~. tor
Changoo fund (legal) strncllrre D
j. Liquidatoo positions D
k, Chang,>d inl'estment style D
I. Changed portfolio stnK1ure D
m. Closed fund(s) to new investors 0
n. 0therO

3.

D

Do you plan to implement strategic responses to the new registration and disclosure
rcquireme11ts'I

a. NoO
b. If yes 0, "hat strategic n.-sponscs do you plan to implemci1t

4. In what"'")~ will the 11<:11 registrntion and disclosure mies affect your fund(s) in the

nex1 5 years?
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In whnt wai will tl1c new rogi trntion and disclosure rules affect your indu try in the
ne~1 5 years?

6. Please respond to the questions pcr1nining to the new registrn.tion and roponing
requirements in each cat<gol')c
a. Time:
i. Complian e \\1th the Dodd-Frank Act rcponing m1uirements will take
approximatelic
1. 100 - 250hoursperyearO
2. 250 - 500 hours per year D
3. 500 - 750 h ur,; perymO
4. 750 - 1000 ho1111i per ym D
5. More than I000 hour,; per year D

D

6. Other

ii. Compliance with all federa l rules and procedures (Tr<a5111')'. SEC, CFTC
etc.) "ill take approximately:

I

hours p,'1' year

b. Cost (defined as a tual expenses incurred):
1.

Complinn ~ with the new r~po11.ingrequir~ments ,,ill nnnui111y
approximately:

»st

I. S50.000 - SI00.000 0
2. Sl00,000 - S200.000 0
1 S200,ooo - 00,000 D
4. S300,000 - S400.000 0
5. ~loro than S500.000 0
6. 0t11Cr
D

r---

ii. Compliance witl1all federa l rules and procedures (Treasury. SEC, CFfC
etc.) will annually cost approximately:

I
7. Would you take tl1e current n:g1Jlatol')' regime into account in detennining the appropriotc
ize of asset (AU~I) for your fund(s)?
a. No.O
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a. lfYes 0 i. How would you take it into account?

11.

Did you take it into account before the Dodd-Frank Act was ena ted?
a. o. O
b. Yes.□

8. After the ena Im nt of the Dodd-Frank Act reporting and disclosure requirements, what
asset izc (A M) would you desire to operate your fund(s):
a. S150 mil - $500 mil 0
b. SS00 mil - $1 bilO
C. SI bi l - Sl.5 bil 0
d. 1.5 bil - 2 bil 0
e. More than $2 bil 0

I

f Other
g. /AO

0

9. What affected your respon e to Item 8?

I0. \\ ould you take the Fonn PF threshold for quarterly reporting of $1.5 bil asset ( M)
into acco1111t in detem1ining the appropriate size of assets (A M) for your fund(s )?

a. NoO
b. If yes 0, how would you take it into a count?

11. Have the new registration and di closure requirements affected your fund"s earnings /
net rate of retum to your investors?

a.

oO
b. If ye 0, how?
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12. Have the ne, registration and disclosure requirements affected the profits of your
investment management company?

a. NoO
b. If yes 0 , how?
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